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Policies to create fruitful conditions for work and life are at the heart 
of political debates and societal discourse. The tenets of this discourse 
have changed over time and depend on economic circumstances, but 
the main interest prevails untouched. Work, and especially gainful 
work, has been seen as a central issue in an individual’s life and 
essential for the wealth of society. From a historical perspective, 
there have been good reasons for thinking in this way: technological 
progress, increases in labour productivity and improving wealth have 
been positively interconnected since the 1950s and have benefitted 
the individual’s as well society’s interest and wellbeing. For the 
most part, the positive circulation of efficiency and the increase in 
the wealth of households and nations was secured by simultaneous 
development and extension of democratic and social rights at the 
workplace as well as in society at large. The strengthening of the 
welfare state led to the institutionalisation and mainstreaming of the 
virtuous circle of economic efficiency, active economic participation 
and extension of social and democratic rights at work. Over time and 
with the development of new economic and political power relations, 
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this virtuous circle was disturbed, while power asymmetries in the 
economy intensified. The power asymmetries between economic and 
social interest, actors of capital and labour, society and environment 
caused an increase in the inequalities in work and society, which in 
turn is reflected in the new economic and social structures.
As an outcome of long-term structural changes in the economy 
and society, the current labour market and working life have been 
characterised by economic and social restructuring, crisis, recession, 
increases in inequalities, individualisation of performance and risks 
and shifting boundaries of work and social activity. These changes 
in discourse and reality illustrate the importance of the research on 
work and welfare. Similar to the “golden age” of economic prosperity 
and social development, in the context of recession, work and 
welfare, studies are expected to solve the actual dilemmas of working 
life and economic development. Academic and sectoral research is 
challenged to meet the expectations by developing quality of working 
life studies. In Finland, like in many countries, not only has the 
level and quality of research been upgraded, but a new generation 
of working life experts has also been educated and special doctoral 
training programmes have been established to meet the challenges of 
life and social change. The idea and goal of training a new generation 
of experts and upgrading the prevailing level of working life research 
was based on the notion that markets alone are incapable of creating a 
twenty-first century knowledge society or solving social and political 
tensions. Societies must realise this and invest more in work and 
welfare studies not only as an educational and research programme, 
but also as a public good. This is not only important in terms of 
solving acute problems of unemployment and inequality, but also 
in terms of shaping a critical debate about underlying problems and 
presenting options for the future.
The Finnish doctoral training programme of work and welfare 
studies (LabourNet), jointly financed by the Academy of Finland and 
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a consortium of universities and research institutions in Finland, 
is a good example of a focused initiative to upgrade the quality and 
societal relevance of working life research and to develop a new 
generation of experts who are able to act as change agents. With the 
increasing complexity and “glocalization” of economic and social life, 
an important goal was to introduce the early career doctoral students 
to international networks. This involved internationalising and 
upgrading their level of theoretical, methodological and empirical 
knowledge of working life research. To realise this, LabourNet has 
actively encouraged the international mobility of doctoral students 
and their supervisors by organising annual workshops, conferences 
and training programmes in cooperation with various universities, 
research centres and networks. 
The chapters in this publication are based on papers presented at 
an international seminar organised at the University of Tampere in 
cooperation with LabourNet and several European universities. The 
seminar gave PhD students a chance to present their papers to an 
international audience. More importantly, we offered constructive 
feedback and advice from senior researchers and specialists in their 
topics. The presenters were encouraged to further develop their 
article manuscripts in order to be published and contribute to critical 
social discourse. The chapters of this book cover various topics and 
methodological approaches, but the common thread is that they 
represent the voice and skills of a generation of experts on issues 
of working life research. With these papers, we also open the door 
to a fresh debate on current issues and ask, for example, how does 
economic recession challenge working life? How do we interpret the 
boom of atypical work? How should the boundary between paid and 
unpaid work be redefined? Whereas the “typical worker” is entitled 
to most work‐related welfare, those individuals who do not meet the 
traditional definitions of paid work have difficulties claiming their 
social rights. We raise the discussion on how work and welfare are 
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interrelated. What are the implications of these interrelations for 
various groups of people of working age inside and outside the labour 
market? What role do gender and social class play in the ongoing 
restructuring of working life? Based on these chapters, this book 
demonstrates how working life studies can contribute to a better 
understanding of societal change. The publication provides an insight 
into some of the major themes in contemporary working life research 
and offers new avenues for linking research with policies and policy 
reforms.
Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (Eds),
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Tampere: Tampere University Press, 15–26.
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Many have argued that the nature of work has changed fundamentally 
during recent decades. The golden years or “trente glorieuses” of full 
employment and generous welfare states ended by the late 1970s. 
Instead came neoliberalism, market-oriented reforms and permanent 
austerity (Pierson 2002). Globalisation, deindustrialisation and 
ageing populations have been shaping post-industrial economies and 
labour markets (Häusermann & Palier 2008, 561). Postindustrialism 
introduced “new social risks” resulting from deindustrialisation, 
tertiarisation of employment, the massive entry of women into 
the labour market, increasing instability in family structures and 
destandardisation of employment (Armingeon & Bonoli 2006; 
Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, & Seeleib-Kaiser 2012; Taylor-
Gooby 2004). Globalisation has made capital and labour more 
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mobile, increasing pressures for companies to compete, innovate, 
and digitalise, while increasing the need for labour market flexibility 
(Buchholz et al. 2009). In Europe, EU integration has enabled more job 
mobility and harmonised labour standards, while the Euro-project 
has limited possibilities for fiscal policies. Worldwide, immigration 
is affecting both the top as well as the bottom segments of labour 
markets (Sassen 2008). Finally, the recent financial, economic and 
migration crises have not halted any of these developments but seem 
to have reinforced them.
Obviously, there is a risk of assuming a “special-times bias” 
and resorting to “grand narratives”. In other words, we tend to 
overemphasise that we live in unique times as a result of magnifying 
specific phenomena while losing sight of the broader historical trends 
and overall stability. Observations and reflections on how large global 
processes are changing the nature of work are at least as old as Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations and Karl Marx’s Capital. Especially the 
influence of the latter continued to be felt throughout the twentieth 
century in critiques on Taylorism and Fordism and later through 
theories of the “degradation of work” and segmentation as a result of 
technological change (Braverman 1974; Piore & Doeringer 1971). In 
that sense, there is nothing new: work is changing all the time and at 
the same time, while looking back, past changes might not seem as 
drastic now as they seemed to contemporary observers. However, that 
should not stop researchers from observing and explaining changes 
in work. Still, of course, changes in work and specific labour market 
phenomena should be seen in their broader historical context. 
In this volume, we look at the changes in work from various 
perspectives by using multiple methodological approaches at 
different levels of analysis. One shortcoming in the existing literature 
is that studies focus either on macrolevel changes or on microlevel 
practices but rarely recognise or make explicit the links between 
those. Macrolevel studies on changing labour markets and welfare 
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states often sketch broad developments and present aggregate data 
on how changes affect particular groups of people but shy away, for 
example, from telling what this means for a single mother who has to 
cope with an insecure job on a day-to-day basis. Microlevel studies on 
changing forms and practices of work are crucial in understanding 
how individuals are affected but often fail to explicate how individual-
level changes are part of broader phenomena. 
In this introductory chapter, we attempt to sketch an analytical 
framework that combines explaining broad developments and 
understanding everyday consequences. We emphasise the importance 
of institutional contexts, politics and ideas. Each of the following 
chapters of the book discusses different topics with different 
methodological approaches in a great variety of national contexts. The 
chapters are grouped according to four broad themes: women in the 
labour market, migration, new forms of work and policy responses to 
new challenges. However, as emphasised in this introduction, themes 
tend to overlap and cannot always strictly be separated.
How are the boundaries of work 
shaped and reshaped?
Exogenous pressures, macro-social 
processes and social mechanisms
There are ongoing processes taking place outside the labour market 
that are, nevertheless, fundamentally reshaping labour markets. 
These can be called exogenous pressures. Exogenous pressures 
appear in the literature as similar concepts under various names. 
Usually, the concepts have in common that they happen outside 
the direct influence of individuals or policy-makers and that they 
are expected to pose some kind of pressure or threat to work in its 
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current form. They are “exogenous” because they only include those 
pressures taking place outside the domain of routine policy-making. 
They cannot be adjusted directly unless rather drastic measures are 
taken. Sometimes exogeneity is confused with externality, or taking 
place outside of the country, as opposed to domestically. However, 
pressures like an ageing population, the feminisation of the workforce 
and deindustrialisation are exogenous. In other words, they cannot 
be counteracted with “routine” policy instruments even though they 
are predominantly domestic processes. 
The most obvious cause of fundamental social or institutional 
change is the “exogenous shock” (Castles 2010; Streeck & Thelen 
2005): an international or domestic economic or political crisis that 
poses a direct threat and opens a window of opportunity for radical 
changes. The logic behind exogenous pressures is different because 
pressure is constant and often insufficiently urgent for policy-makers 
to act upon. The term “pressure” is also different from “threat” or 
“risk” because a pressure is presumed to be present rather than just a 
hypothetical future event. Observations tell us that the pressures are 
there and affecting our welfare, whereas our advanced economic and 
demographic models can forecast how these pressures will develop. 
However, even though one cannot speak of “risk”, we are dealing with 
highly uncertain outcomes (Blyth 2011). 
Part of this uncertainty is inherent to exogenous pressures and 
the reshaping of work because of these being “big and slow moving 
macro-social processes” (Pierson 2003). Retrospectively, we might say 
that we did not see many pressures coming or failed to recognise the 
impact they would have. Exogenous pressures are slow-moving causal 
processes that are incremental or cumulative. Also, the consequences 
of exogenous pressures are largely cumulative and path-dependent; 
little by little, the labour market changes in response to the changing 
exogenous environment and reforms that were enacted previously. 
Another possibility is that exogenous pressures have threshold 
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effects: pressure increases until a certain boiling point, leading to 
more immediate crisis or change (Pierson 2003, 182). 
Problematic with the long-time horizons of causes (exogenous 
pressures) and outcomes (changing work) is that they obfuscate the 
causal chains and mechanisms that link them. How do we empirically 
prove that a macro-social process that started 30, 40 or 50 years ago 
has led to a certain outcome in the present, while an infinite number 
of other factors (exogenous or endogenous) might have played a role 
at the same time? Social scientists tend to think of stability as the 
standard in the social world and change as the exception, but what if 
we consider that change is in fact the standard (Blyth 2011, 84–85)? 
Part of the problem is that, to quote David Hume, there is “too 
much action at a distance” (Pierson 2003, 200), meaning that we try 
to explain outcomes by looking at causes that are too distant, both 
in time and space (Hedström & Swedberg 1998). This applies to 
explaining how a macrolevel cause, for example globalisation, results 
in a macrolevel outcome, such as a restructuring of the labour market. 
Importantly for this book, this limitation also applies to macrolevel 
explanations for microlevel outcomes. How to provide the causal and 
empirical link between an exogenous pressure, such as globalisation, 
and, for example, a Polish posted worker’s precariousness? 
One solution is to focus on the social mechanisms that underlie 
change. Changes at a macrolevel should be supported by explanations 
at a microlevel. The literature on social mechanisms suggests that the 
aim should not be to draw an exclusive list of conditions for social 
change but to describe the crucial elements causing such change, 
given certain conditions and context (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010; 
Mayntz 2004). The aim is to arrive at a theory of the middle range 
that is clear, precise and simple (Hedström & Ylikoski 2010, 61).
Thinking in terms of “Coleman’s boat” to explain macro-social 
phenomena might be instructive in this case (Coleman 1990). In 
Coleman’s social theory, change on a macrolevel occurs according to 
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a macro-micro-macro scheme (Figure 1). First, factors at a macrolevel 
shape the situation or context in which individuals operate and which 
affect their behaviour. This might be, for example, the situation in a 
globalised world where borders are increasingly open and in which 
opportunities for cross-national migration arise. Second, individuals 
interact strategically at a microlevel in accordance with their own 
beliefs, attitudes and preferences, but also in relation to the behaviour 
of others. For example, if local firms in country A are not hiring low-
skilled workers and a neighbour got a well-paid job in country B, 
this might be a strong incentive for other low-skilled workers to try 
their luck in country B. Third, the accumulation of interactions at a 
microlevel might lead to a transformation and a new equilibrium at 
the macrolevel. In our example, this may lead to mass migration of 
low-skilled workers from country A to country B.
Several of the contributions to this book show how situational 
mechanisms lead to individuals’ actions. Matyska (Chapter 6) 
shows how Polish workers respond to the opening up of European 
borders and legal and economic constructions of posted work. Other 
contributions to this book illustrate how changing interactions at 
the microlevel transform into a new equilibrium at the macrolevel. 
Chapter 2 by Kangas, Palme and Kainu analyses how changes in 
employment patterns lead to differences in the sustainability of welfare 
states in European countries. Jonker-Hoffrén shows how groupthink 
processes and the focus on issues of economic competitiveness among 
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trade unions in Finland have structurally weakened their position in 
collective bargaining structures (Chapter 10). Perkiö, however, shows 
that changes in microlevel actions are not always sufficient to result 
in transformation at the macrolevel (Chapter 11). Despite intensive 
debate throughout several decades on the introduction of a universal 
basic income, this has not resulted in any concrete change in policy-
making in Finland.
Beyond automatic responses: politics, 
institutions and ideas
The macro-micro-level scheme helps explain the relations between 
macrolevel phenomena and interactions at the microlevel. There is a 
risk, however, of oversimplifying social mechanisms and assuming 
that they apply universally as automated processes. This approach 
leaves out one crucial element: politics in their institutional and 
historical contexts (Emmenegger et al. 2012). Globalisation, 
technological change and deindustrialisation do not need to result 
in the deterioration of work or greater inequality. Rather, their 
outcomes result from decisions that governments and other policy 
actors make. One common political strategy to respond to exogenous 
pressures has been to deregulate labour markets and retrench social 
rights, resulting in some of the growing inequalities that are analysed 
in this book. Liberalisation is, however, as various authors argue, 
not the only possible policy response. Instead of Thatcher’s famous 
TINA (There Is No Alternative), perhaps it is time to think in terms 
of WITA: What is The Alternative? 
Riekhoff (Chapter 9) shows that European governments tend 
to choose similar types of labour market reform in response to 
globalisation, but that domestic economic, political and institutional 
factors play a dominant role as well. Jokela (Chapter 5) emphasises 
the contradictory politics of not regulating migrant labour because 
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it might be profitable to do so in neoliberal markets. These cases 
highlight that labour market outcomes are such because governments 
act or refrain from acting in a certain way. In addition, institutions 
and history strongly exert influence on the contextual situation, 
individual actions and transformation of work. In her comparative 
study on women attorneys’ pro bono work, Choroszewicz shows 
that the incentives to provide such work differ between Poland and 
Finland (Chapter 7). Kudo investigates whether family policies, on a 
national level, have an effect on women’s economic contribution in 
the household, concluding that the availability of public education for 
pre-school children can have positive effects (Chapter 3). 
Finally, various contributions emphasise the importance of ideas 
in the context of the politics of changing work (Béland & Cox 2011). 
Exogenous pressures might not always be a problem, unless the idea 
takes hold that they are. Moreover, political actors and decision-
makers do not just have objective and material interests, but their 
interests are being shaped by ideas. Mustosmäki, Oinas and Anttila 
examine the how the idea of lean management has been transposed 
from the private sector to the public sector in the Nordic countries, 
arguing that such practices might be a wrong solution to the wrong 
problem (Chapter 8). Jonker-Hoffrén critically argues in Chapter 10 
that the ideas of neoliberalism and competitiveness are particularly 
strong in shaping trade union policies in Finland, even if these can 
be seen to conflict with their direct interests. Ideas are also important 
for changing the dominant paradigm. However, as Perkiö shows, the 
political arguments behind the idea of a universal basic income have 
evolved over the years following trends in the public debate (Chapter 
11). Still, this need not be a problem, because over time a radical idea 
can become a realistic solution to contemporary worries. 
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Structure of the book
The chapters of this book are short essay-style contributions with the 
aim of covering a broad range of themes and reaching a wide reader 
audience. Many of the contributions are based on theses, articles and 
other scientific work of the authors that can be consulted if the reader 
is interested in deepening the topic. All contributions to this volume 
handle complex and multifaceted problems in work and working life 
and can, therefore, not easily be grouped under one thematic header. 
We have grouped the chapters by broad themes but acknowledge that 
in several contributions the themes overlap. We also consider this 
part of the strength of this book. 
The first part focuses on the life course and gender in the labour 
market and the consequences and implications of demographic 
changes in the working population. Kangas, Palme and Kainu 
(Chapter 2) offer a broad overview on the implications of changing 
employment patterns on the sustainability of the welfare state. Kudo 
(Chapter 3) empirically investigates the factors that contribute to 
women’s household economic contribution across countries. The 
second part of the book focuses on varieties of work and migration. 
In line with Sassen’s (2008) work, the authors show that there are 
two labour migration circuits. Koikkalainen (Chapter 4) analyses 
the transnational market for high-level talent within the European 
Union. Jokela (Chapter 5) analyses the role of national institutions in 
the regulation of low-skilled and mostly informal types of migration. 
Matyska (Chapter 6) shows that there is not always a clear boundary 
between formally and informally regulated forms of labour migration. 
In Part Three, the authors analyse how new ways of working are 
taking shape. Although pro bono work has a long history among 
lawyers, Choroszewicz (Chapter 7) analyses why women attorneys in 
Poland and Finland offer part of their services for free. Mustosmäki, 
Oinas and Anttila (Chapter 8) describe how the introduction of lean 
practices are changing work in the public sector in Nordic countries. 
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The final Part Four focuses on the the politics and possibilities 
of changing work. Riekhoff (Chapter 9) empirically investigates 
the policy responses to globalisation in unemployment benefits 
and employment protection legislation in Europe. Jonker-Hoffrén 
(Chapter 10) critically analyses the trade union movement in Finland 
and their focus on unit labour costs and competitiveness issues. 
Finally, Perkiö (Chapter 11) analyses how the idea of a universal 
basic income has taken root in the Finnish public debate, but how 
arguments in favour have changed over time along with political 
trends.
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Welfare state entry and exit 
over the life course
Employment and the sustainability of the 
welfare state in different worlds of welfare
Olli Kangas, Joakim Palme & Markus Kainu
Introduction
The concept of “sustainability deficit”, or fiscal gap as it is sometimes 
called, pertains to the ability of a welfare state to maintain its current 
social policy programmes, spending levels, tax and other policies 
for decades to come (European Commission 2009; 2012). If we look 
at the sustainability deficit from a life cycle perspective, the role of 
employment becomes essential for combatting the deficit (Lee & 
Mason 2011). High employment rates have been a cornerstone of the 
renowned Scandinavian welfare state model. 
One of the most influential books in the field of welfare state 
studies is The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism1 by Gøsta Esping-
1 The book has been extremely influential, and according to Google Scholar, 
it has more than 36,000 citations. There also is a huge number of critical views 
on the book. The very existence of the three worlds has been questioned (e.g. 
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Andersen (1990) who argued that the social policy systems and 
employment patterns clustered countries in a way that made it possible 
to talk about three worlds of welfare capitalism: liberal, conservative 
and social-democratic welfare states. Esping-Andersen launched a 
concept of decommodification that soon became the buzzword in all 
welfare state studies. The concept pertains to the degree that national 
social policy solutions can give people freedom from commodifying 
capitalist markets. Consequently, he argued that employment and 
stratification follow regime-specific patterns. 
Following Esping-Andersen’s idea, we ask how the configurations 
of employment among the advanced industrial nations are 
interlinked with the welfare state regimes. The focus is on the entry 
and exit patterns on the labour market where the state, family and 
market intersect and interact. The process is intimately related to the 
silent revolutions (Esping-Andersen 1999, 2009; Esping-Andersen, 
Gallie, Hemerijk & Myers 2002) in post-industrial labour markets 
where female labour market participation, service employment and 
new entry/exit patterns challenge the prevailing welfare regimes. 
However, we introduce some additional welfare state regimes. We 
classify countries into Nordic, Western Central European, Anglo-
Saxon, Southern (Mediterranean) and Eastern European welfare 
states. Furthermore, we analyse the gender-dimension in social 
policy, employment and social stratification in particular. 
We first give a short summary of the databases used. We start our 
analyses by looking at transitions from school to work to see how 
different regimes manage to facilitate that transition. Then follows 
a longer section where the labour market participation patterns of 
mothers are examined. The last empirical section looks at the exit 
Castles 1993; Castles et al. 2012), the book has been criticised from the feministic 
perspective (e.g. Daly & Lewis 2000; Lewis 1992; Orloff 1993) and totally new 
worlds of welfare have been added (e.g. Ferrera 1996; Gough & Wood 2004; Van 
Kersbergen 1995). 
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patterns of the older component of the labour force and stratification 
risks associated with that phase in the life cycle. In the final section, 
we discuss our findings in more general terms. 
Data
In the 1980s, there was very little systematic data available about 
the Southern European countries, Asia and Latin America, not to 
speak about the former socialist hemisphere. This is now changing. 
Consequently, the number of identified welfare regimes has increased 
(see e.g. Castles, Leibfried, Lewis, & Obinger 2012; Scruggs, Jahn 
& Kuitto 2014). In addition to macro-level data, Eurostat provides 
individual-level micro data (the European Union Statistics on 
Income and Living Conditions—longitudinal micro-data EU SILC) 
(Eurostat 2013). The flipside is that the extensive EU-data excludes 
non-European countries. 
In the following, we have, when permitted by the data, expanded 
the number of worlds of welfare to five welfare regimes (e.g. Castles 
et al. 2012): Nordic (consisting of Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden); Continental European (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland); Anglo-liberal (Ireland and the UK; 
in some graphs we also depict the Australian (AUS) and the United 
States (US) developmental patterns); Southern European (Greece, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain); and Post-Socialist (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia). Depending on 
the availability of data, the number of countries in each regime may 
vary. We first use a wide variety of countries and thereafter we move 
to use OECD aggregate level data and the EU-SILC. Regimes are here 
used as a heuristic device for descriptive purposes to more easily 
group countries and make comparisons. 
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From education to employment
There are substantial variations in national educational systems, and 
these differences have important ramifications for the school-leaving 
age and for the forms and duration of the school-to-work transitions 
(Brzinsky-Fay 2011; 2014; European Societies 2014). Figure 1 depicts 
employment rates for males and females who have taken their 
exams one and five years ago, respectively. When it comes to those 
who graduated a year ago, the gender gap is negligible. It is only in 
Southern European countries where there is a visible gender divide. 
Employment rates in the other countries are relatively gender neutral, 
Figure 1. Employment rates (%) by gender, one, five and ten years after finishing education
(OECD 2013)
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but there are marked differences between countries: the overall 
employment rates vary from the very low 50 percent in Greece to 80 
percent in the Netherlands and Switzerland.
While gender is not an important divide in employment one year 
after graduation, divisions become more pronounced the longer the 
time elapsed since graduation. After five years, gender differences are 
substantial and regime differences visible. Under the Post-Socialist 
and Southern-European regimes, and to some extent also in France 
and Belgium, women seem to have problems in combining child-
rearing and employment which, in turn, results in either giving up 
employment or a trend of very low fertility rates. Differences are 
smaller in the Nordic countries, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
the UK. Thus, the gender divide follows regimes to some extent, but 
not completely. 
In addition to gender, educational attainment creates obstacles and 
sorts youngsters into different positions. Youngsters without upper 
secondary education have significantly more problems entering the 
labour markets than the better educated. On average, less that 50 
percent of the youth with low educational attainment were without 
a job one year after finishing school. The situation is the worst in 
Southern Europe and the Post-Socialist countries. 
After five years, the situation is better: employment rates are 
higher after five years than after one year past graduation, but there 
still are substantial differences between low and high-skilled labour. 
Differences are the smallest in Sweden and in the Netherlands. In 
some cases (Austria and France), employment rates among the 
highly-skilled are lower after five years than they were after one 
year—something that is related to raising children and other family 
responsibilities. 
In 2011, almost half of the group aged 15–29 participated in 
education and close to 40 percent were already employed. There was 
a group of young people (10–20 percent of the age group), referred to 
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as NEETs, who were involved neither in employment, nor education 
or training (Eurofound 2012; OECD 2013). Although we can also 
here trace country-related variations, there are clear welfare-regime 
related patterns. The NEET problem is the smallest under the 
Nordic and Continental European regimes. On the other end of the 
continuum, we have the Southern European regime with a NEET-rate 
of 22 percent. The Liberal (19%) and the Post-Socialist (16%) regimes 
are between these extremes. The best results are achieved in countries 
that combine school, work through various kinds of apprenticeship 
programmes and activation measures, such as in Sweden, Austria, 
the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark. 
Employment of mothers
For the sustainability of the public finances, it is important to 
increase employment rates not only in the beginning and in the end 
of the work career, but it is also important to increase labour-force 
participation rates in the middle of the work career for women in 
particular. Thus, it is decisive how easy it is to unify work and family 
(Hobson 2013; Prince Cooke 2011). 
When it comes to the overall female employment rates, there is 
still a more or less clear divide between countries and between as 
well as within regimes (OECD 2012). The Nordic pattern follows the 
upside-down U-formation. Traditionally, having children in Southern 
Europe led to giving up employment, which was reflected in the peak 
employment figures for females in the 20–24-years age bracket, an 
employment rate that sharply diminished with age (Esping-Andersen 
2009). The pattern is still visible. The previous M-curve for the Anglo-
liberal regime indicated that women with family responsibilities 
were outside the labour force, but once their children had grown 
up, mothers re-entered employment. The Liberal regime has “gone 
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Nordic”, and now the female participation rates resemble the Nordic 
ones, although at lower participation levels (OECD 2013). 
An alternative way to look at the impact of motherhood upon 
employment is to compare employment among women without 
children and women with children. Whereas in Scandinavia this 
difference, or motherhood penalty, is negligible, in many other 
countries the penalty is substantial. In the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, the motherhood penalty is over 30 percentage points, and 
in the UK and Germany, it reaches 20 percentage points (OECD 
2013). The EU SILC provides us with data to carry out comparisons 
on longitudinal micro-data and to show to what extent welfare 
regimes display differences in motherhood-related absences from the 
labour market (Figure 2). It is important to recognise that not only 
are childcare responsibilities lying on the shoulders of the mothers, 
but also all other forms of care are the responsibility of women 
throughout their life cycles as Figure 2 indicates.
As can be seen in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, 
Poland and the UK, the most intensive periods of care concentrate 
in the bracket 25–45 years of age. In the Czech Republic and UK, the 
absent periods tend to be somewhat longer. In Denmark and Sweden, 
absences are very short, and the care responsibilities are more or 
less evenly distributed over the life course. Southern Europe and the 
Benelux countries, particularly Luxemburg, display their own pattern 
where family-related care tasks substantially increase with age and 
the periods last longer.
Labour market exit
Up to the 1990s, there was a common trend of decreasing (male) 
participation in the labour force across regimes. Since 1990, the 
trend towards an earlier exit has been broken in many countries, 
and simultaneously, female labour-force participation has increased. 
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Figure 3 indicates that the new trends are affecting countries in all 
“worlds” of capitalism. Sweden has maintained the highest overall 
participation rates during the entire period, with no real decline for 
the total labour force. However, if it had not been for the increased 
female participation rate, the participation rate would have dipped 
until the mid-1990s. The UK and the USA both see recovering 
participation rates for men and an increasing trend for women 
during the latter part of the period. The increased participation rates 
for Germany are remarkable, but also in France we see an increase 
for the recent period, albeit from lower levels. The negative impact of 
the 2008 crisis is visible in the Southern European countries, Ireland 
(only for males) and Iceland.
Figure 2. Female labour force status “taking care of family-related care responsibilities” 
(%); duration of care-related absences from the labour market according to age
Note: Authors’ calculations based on EU-SILC micro-data (Eurostat).
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Conclusions
A few tentative conclusions follow from our explorations. The first one 
is about the shift in the discursive focus. Economic and demographic 
challenges for the welfare state have taken the floor, and consequently, 
the Esping-Andersenian “decommodification” has given way to 
“recommodification”, or how to put people (back) into employment. 
Countries are looking for means to increase employment among the 
young, to give better possibilities for mothers to work and to create 
incentives for the ageing to continue to work. 
Secondly, the notion of “three worlds” of welfare capitalism is 
less valid today than a quarter century ago. This has to do with two 
different processes. First, the three “old” regimes have changed in 
Figure 3. Employment participation rates of elderly (60 to 
64 years of age) workers in OECD countries
(OECD 2015)
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some important respects due mainly to the modernisation of family 
policy and activation in labour market policy. Second, the old world 
of the 18 OECD countries is changing by extension of the OECD and 
of the EU. 
The life cycle deficit inspection still reveals some welfare regime-
specific peculiarities. As a rule, in Central Europe the youngsters enter 
the labour markets earlier than, for example, in the Nordic cluster, but 
in contrast, the older workers have an earlier exit from employment 
than do, for example, the Swedes. The specific problem for many post-
Socialist countries is the late entry and early exit from the labour 
markets. Some East-Asian countries suffer from the same problem. In 
the Nordic countries, the sunny side of heavy investments in publicly 
provided social services is high female employment rates, which, in 
turn, effectively combats the sustainability deficit of the welfare state. 
The level of employment is essential for the solvency of the welfare 
state. In fact, high employment rates have been a cornerstone of the 
renowned Scandinavian welfare state model. However, as can be seen 
in the graphs, employment problems in the Nordic countries are 
associated with the young. The issue in Central and Southern Europe 
is the (too) early exit from the labour markets. In addition, a low 
female labour force participation diminishes the value of production 
in these countries, which is a challenge for East Asia too.
We have illustrated how countries differ when it comes to critical 
phases in the economic lifecycle. The fact that countries differ not 
only suggests that institutions matter but also that there is room for 
policy learning. A broader understanding of how welfare, education 
and labour market policies work to produce different kinds of labour 
market participation patterns for youngsters, parents and elderly 
people is an important lesson, and we should make good use of that 
lesson if we want to benefit from best practices in research. In the end, 
the lesson is about designing policies that can foster high levels of 
employment in all relevant phases of the lifecycle to ensure equality 
in society as well as sustainability of the welfare state simultaneously. 
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The recent increase in the number of dual-earner couples has led to 
a growth in arguments regarding women’s economic contribution.1 
Studies on women’s economic contribution began with Sørensen 
and McLanahan (1987), who examined the changes in women’s 
economic contribution from the 1940s to the 1980s in the United 
States. According to the authors, a women’s economic contribution 
(dependency) is measured by “her contribution to the couple’s 
income” (Sørensen & McLanahan 1987, 66)—namely a woman’s 
income relative to her spouse’s income. Since then, there have been 
some studies on relative earnings within couples in the United States 
(Raley, Mattingly, & Bianchi 2006), European countries (Arber & 
Ginn 1995; Van Berkel & De Graaf 1998; Ward, Dale, & Joshi 1996) and 
Japan (Sangu 2002). Furthermore, with the increase in the availability 
of cross-national datasets, there has been some recent cross-national 
1 Some researchers refer to this issue as “economic dependency”. The terms 
vary according to assumptions regarding the role of women. I use the term 
“economic contribution” in this chapter.
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research (Bianchi, Casper, & Peltola 1999; Estévez-Abe & Hethey 
2008; Stier & Mandel 2009). According to these studies, the economic 
contribution of European and American women has increased over 
the years, even though women tend to depend on their husbands’ 
earnings. Furthermore, some scholars found that the number of 
women who earn more than men has also risen gradually and they 
have examined the patterns of those couples (Winkler, McBride, & 
Andrews 2005; Winslow‐Bowe 2006). However, Japanese women’s 
contribution has continually shown high dependency (Sangu 2002). 
What are the determinants of the recent increase in women’s 
economic contribution? According to previous studies, the 
determinants can be divided mainly into individual and institutional 
settings. First, in terms of the individual level factors, human capital 
theory (Becker 1975) is one of the leading explanations for women’s 
economic contribution. For example, education and age are considered 
the main factors of productivity, meaning that when the individual’s 
education or age is higher, the economic contribution also increases. 
Moreover, the number of children and presence of preschool children 
are crucial determinants of women’s economic contribution from 
householdlevel perspectives. For example, childcare suspends work 
for at least some years and decreases the caretaker’s economic 
contribution (Raley et al. 2006). 
On the other hand, institutional factors such as family policies 
that moderate women’s worklife balance are important explanations 
of women’s economic contribution. Most studies indicate that 
family policies, such as maternity leave and the creation of 
affordable childcare, are influential in increasing women’s economic 
contribution.2
2 Other explanations are provided by Estévez-Abe and Hethey (2008), who 
argue that other countrylevel factors such as the degree of employment protection 
and the size of the public sector affect women’s economic contribution. I do 
not address these factors in this paper, but they are also important in terms of 
women’s economic standing.
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The main findings regarding institutional factors are as follows: 
some researchers advocate the view that family policies enhance 
women’s employment rate (Kenjoh 2005), continuity of employment 
(Stier, Lewin-Epstein, & Braun 2001) and fertility level (Björklund 
2006). On the other hand, others argue that long leave provision 
and childcare benefits could ultimately have negative effects on the 
women’s career and earning prospects (Rønsen & Sundström 2001). 
The prevalent conclusion about the impact of public childcare on 
women’s employment is that generous public childcare enhances 
employment rates among married women and women with young 
children (Korpi 2000; Pettit & Hook 2005; Uunk, Kalmijn, & Muffels 
2005). This is supported by data considering different points in time 
(Uunk et al. 2005) as well as by crossnational comparisons (Korpi 
2000; Pettit & Hook 2005). 
However, one determinant has been ignored in these previous 
studies: women’s lifestyle preferences3. A central discussion on this 
issue is represented by Hakim’s (2000) preference theory, which posits 
that there are three types of typical female preferences. According 
to the theory, a minority of women falls into the work-oriented and 
home-centred categories, while the majority falls into the adaptive 
career category, combining paid work with childcare. 
Is the economic contribution explained either by women’s lifestyle 
preferences or by the implementation of family policies? Referring to 
the study of Stier and Mandel (2009), I establish an appropriate model 
to test this question. According to Stier and Mandel (2009), family 
policy plays a role in moderating women’s economic contribution 
3 Although preference theory has received attention from many researchers, 
it also has some critics. For example, some studies argue that women’s career 
decisions and life satisfaction are determined by multi-dimensional aspects, and 
it is important to consider their interrelation with each other (e.g. Blackburn, 
Browne, Brooks, & Jarman 2002; Warren 2004). In the view of these critics, 
for instance, the financial situation, leisure time, social policies and the power 
of the employer should be taken into account when women’s preferences are 
examined because the female life course is restricted by such factors.
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through labour force participation—long maternity leave decreases 
women’s economic contribution in the short run, whereas higher 
rates of childcare provision increase contributions. However, Stier 
and Mandel’s study does not explain the effect of women’s lifestyle 
preferences; thus, I include women’s lifestyle preferences in my model. 
Furthermore, there is a need to include countries such as Japan, which 
have shown a low female economic contribution (Sangu 2002).
Hypotheses
This chapter addresses the primary question “Is women’s economic 
contribution explained by family policy implementation or female 
lifestyle preferences?” The subsequent hypotheses are established 
in order to test this question. First, I examine the effect of women’s 
attributes on their economic contribution from individual and 
institutionallevel perspectives. According to Stier and Mandel (2009), 
institution-level factors are expected: 
1.1) Long maternity leave decreases women’s economic contribution 
in the short term. 
1.2) An increase in the percentage of childcare facilities leads to an 
increase in women’s economic contribution.
Second, women’s lifestyle preferences are examined. According to 
preference theory (Hakim 2000), there are different types of lifestyle 
preferences: home-oriented, adaptive lifestyle and work-oriented. 
Therefore, I assume that there is a variance in women’s career 
preferences, and the hypothesis is thus stated:
2) The more a woman’s lifestyle preference is career-oriented, the 
higher her economic contribution is.
Last, I expect that family policies might restrict the lifestyle choices 
of women because women might consider their career in light 
of the policy conditions. Furthermore, as previous studies show, 
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women’s economic contribution varies from one country to another, 
and there is no convergent consequence. Thus, I presume that the 
economic contribution is explained by institutional factors rather 
than individual lifestyle preferences. Considering these reasons, the 
hypothesis of the relationship between family policies and lifestyle 
preferences is thus:
3) Family policies affect women’s lifestyle preferences to moderate 
toward being career-oriented.
The hypotheses stated above will be examined in the sections below.
Data and variables
In this chapter, there are two levels of datasets: individual and 
institutional levels. I use The International Social Survey Programme 
(ISSP 2014) to investigate individual-level determinants. ISSP is a 
cross-national dataset created by annual surveys on diverse social 
topics. The data are from 2012; since the theme of that year’s survey 
was Family and Changing Gender Roles, I deem the data appropriate 
to measure the balance within couples.4 The data used for the main 
analysis contain 27 countries and 6,449 female respondents with 
partners.5 Furthermore, the age of respondents is 25–60 years as a 
4 In a previous study (Stier & Mandel 2009), the Luxemburg Income Study 
(LIS) data were used, but they do not include the question of women’s career 
preferences. More precisely, there is a question on “employment situation 
desired” in the LIS data, but it does not explain the lifestyle preference of the 
balance between family and work; it indicates the desired career position rather 
than the current working condition. For this reason, I consider ISSP a more 
appropriate data source to measure female lifestyle preferences.
5 Since cohabitation without marriage is common in some countries, I include 
the respondents with partners. The data for East and West Germany are merged 
in this paper. The countries used are Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Israel, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United States and Venezuela.
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proxy for the workingage population. The institutionallevel data were 
obtained from an online database from the OECD and UNESCO. 
The detailed summary of the institutional-level data is shown in the 
results section.
Individual-level variables
The main dependent variable is “women’s economic contribution”. I 
used question 22 from the ISSP: “Who has the higher income?” The 
question is answered on a sevenpoint scale with the contribution 
increasing with a rise in the number.6 Other individual-level variables 
are education and age as factors of human capital. In addition, the 
number of children (under 18 years old), the presence of preschool 
children, and household income were included as household 
characteristics. 
Women’s lifestyle preferences were measured by the statement: 
“A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and 
children,” which was answered on a fivepoint scale (from zero to four) 
describing to what extent the respondent agreed with the statement.7 
Last, I made the dummy variable of “work,” which indicates whether 
the woman works or not. The summary statistics of the individual 
variables are shown in Table 1.
6 In a previous study (Stier & Mandel 2009), women’s economic contribution is 
calculated by the following equation: women’s economic contribution=[(Fwage) 
/ (Fwage) + (Mwage)]. However, i) there is no question on the wage of the 
respondent and the partner in this questionnaire and ii) the answer on income 
has different scales in each country. Hence, I assume that using question 22 is a 
more appropriate indicator than the question on income.
7 It is not fully appropriate to use this question to measure “lifestyle 
preferences,” as this question might show only the personal values toward 
public opinion. Future studies should utilise a more precise question that asks 
directly the preferred lifestyle choices, such as the ideal career and level of 
family responsibility. 
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Table 1. Individual-level variables
Individual-level Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Woman’s Contribution
6,449
3,38 1,55 1 7
Woman with BA 0,53 0,50 0 1
Woman’s Age 43,03 9,74 25 60 
Difference of Age (male-female≥5) 0,25 0,43 0 1
Household Income (Log) 10,02 2,71 0 16,81
Woman in the Labor Force 0,73 0,45 0 1
Number of Children 0,73 1,02 0 21
Presence of Children (Preschool) 0,29 0,45 0 1
Preference (Higher: Work-Oriented) 2,27 1,27 0 4
It appears that the women’s contribution is slightly less than the men’s 
(mean of women’s contribution = 3.38 on a seven-point scale), and 
many women are in the labour force (mean of work dummy = 0.727). 
These numbers indicate that the women’s average contribution to 
the household is much closer to that of the men’s. It shows that most 
couples are dual-earners; both partners are in the labour market to 
some extent in either a part-time or a full-time setting. In addition, 
the average of women’s lifestyle preferences is 2.27, which means that 
slightly more than half of women really want to work rather than stay 
home to take care of the children. 
Institutional-level variables
In terms of institutional-level variables, I focused on the length of 
paid maternity/parental leave (in weeks) and the percentage of public 
education participation. I also added the proportion of female part-
time workers (female entire) in the country as a control variable. The 
country-level summary statistics are represented in Table 2.
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Table 2. Country-level variables
Macro-Level Variable N Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Long Maternity Leave 27 0,45 0,49 0 1 
% in Public Childcare(preschool) 71,13 0,28 1,91 99,27
% Women Working Part-time 23,64 10,40 5,10 45,60
According to previous studies, long maternity leave has a negative 
effect on women’s economic contribution in the short term (Stier & 
Mandel 2009). Thus, paid maternity leave was measured as a dummy 
variable in terms of whether it was longer than average or not. In 
the dataset, the average paid leave was 51.27 weeks, thus a dummy 
variable was created as “long=1” when it was more than 52 weeks, 
or else “other=0”. The percentage of public education for preschool 
children varied across the countries from a minimum of 2% to a 
maximum of 99%.8 Furthermore, the percentage of female part-time 
workers was considered as a control variable.
The model
Because cross-national data have a nested structure, as individuals 
are included in each country, a multilevel analysis is an appropriate 
method for examining the determinants of women’s economic 
contribution. Multi-level analysis can consider the intraclass 
correlation—namely, the similarity of observations in the same 
country, which is a violation of the basic assumption of statistical 
tests regarding the independence of individual respondents (Hox, 
Moerbeek, & Van de Schoot 2010). First, the individual characteristics 
are described:
(Women’s Economic Contribution)ij = β0j + β1j (Preference)1j + βX+ eij,
Where β0j is the intercept, βX is a vector of individual factors and eij 
describes the error term. Using the multilevel analysis, I presume that 
the intercept varies from one country to another:
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β0j =γ00 + γ01(Maternity leave)j + γ02(Public education)j + γX + u0j.
Here, γ00 is the country-level intercept, the other γs are country-level 
slopes on the individual intercept, and u0j is the error term. As the 
equation denotes, individuals in the same country are regarded as 
having the same country-level factors in this analysis. 
Last, in order to examine Hypothesis 3 (Family policies affect 
women’s career preferences to moderate toward being career-
oriented), I made the slope of the preference random:
β1j =γ10 + γ11(Maternity leave)j + γ12(Public education)j + u1j.
Therefore, if family policies improve the career prospects as I assume, 
then both coefficient γ11 and γ12 will be positive.
Results
Figure 1 shows the distribution of women’s economic contribution 
on a seven-point scale (from one: “I have no income,” to seven: “My 
spouse/partner has no income”. Category four is a middle option: 
“We have about the same income”).9 
According to Figure 1, in most countries, the women tend to rely 
on their partner’s income. However, the dependency rate varies from 
one country to another. For example, women in the East Asian and 
South American regions have a significantly higher dependency rate. 
On the other hand, couples from European countries have relatively 
minor differences in their income, indicating that Category 3 is the 
dominant option.
9 In the original data, the order of the scale is the other way around. Moreover, 
I created Figure 1 using those respondents included in the main analysis. 
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Table 3 shows the main variables clustered by country. Women’s 
lifestyle preferences are focused around the mean, but more women 
have a home-oriented view in some countries (countries with a 
preference of less than two points). Paid parental leave is included as 
paid maternity leave because more women tend to take parental leave 
compared to men. Public education for preschool children varies 
among countries. The ratios of East Asian countries are relatively 
small; on the other hand, Europe’s ratios are larger compared to those 
of other countries. Additionally, Table 4 shows the determinants 
Figure 1. Women’s Economic Contribution
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Table 3. Main Variables
Preference Paid Maternity Leave Public Education for 
Preschool Children
Source ISSP (2012) OECD Family 
Database (2012)
World Bank Education 
Statistics (2012)*a
Argentina 1,50 18*b 68,02 
Australia 2,62 18 22,04 
Canada 2,73 52 93,39 
Chile 1,55 30*c 33,53 
Croatia 1,80 56*c 85,77 
Czech Republic 1,70 110 97,89 
Denmark 3,01 50 80,73 
Finland 2,42 159 91,52 
France 2,45 42 87,16 
Germany 2,96 57 34,93 
Iceland 2,81 26 87,74 
Ireland 2,65 26 1,91 
Israel 1,96 14*c 90,89 
Japan 2,30 58 28,68 
South Korea 1,92 65 18,89 
Latvia 1,47 94*c 94,90 
Lithuania 2,06 62*c 99,27 
Mexico 1,38 12 86,10 
Norway 2,97 87 54,32 
Poland 1,92 24 84,28 
Slovakia 1,19 164 95,91 
Slovenia 2,10 52.1*c 97,14 
Spain 2,54 16 68,70 
Sweden 2,95 60 82,85 
Switzerland 2,16 14 96,16 
United States 2,17 0 56,98 
Venezuela 1,69 18*b 80,89 
Mean 2,27 51,27 71,13 
S.D. 1,27 41,02 28,36 
Min 0,00 0,00 1,91 
Max 4,00 164,00 99,27 
N 6449 27 27
a) Enrolment (public / public + private)*100  The year of data is the ones closest to 2012.
b) ECLAC and UNICEF - Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean. (2011, 
July). Newsletter on Progress Towards the Millennium Development Goals from a Child 
Rights Perspective, Childcare and Parental Leave. Challenges Bulletin, 12,1-12.
c) Data derived from 2014
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of women’s economic contribution. In Model 1, I examined the 
determinants of women’s economic contribution without controlling 
for the effect of the dummy variable of females in the labour market. 
Model 1 indicates that if women have completed higher education, 
they contribute more economically to the household. Moreover, all 
characteristics of households show the effect on women’s economic 
contribution. For example, the increase in the number of children 
and presence of preschool children affect the female economic 
contribution negatively, which is explained by the difficulty of 
balancing the caretaker role and work at the same time.
What are the effects of the main variables, namely family policies 
and women’s preferences? Model 1 shows that if the women’s lifestyle 
preference is work-oriented, the economic contribution will rise. Thus, 
female preference affects their career choice significantly according 
to their preference (Hypothesis 2 is supported). Furthermore, 
public childcare for preschool children has a dramatic effect on the 
economic contribution between the two family-policy variables 
(=+.709 to intercept), as suggested in Hypothesis 1.2. It shows that 
the more a given country provides public education for preschool 
children, the more women will contribute to the income distribution. 
Nonetheless, unlike the previous study, long maternity leave does not 
have a negative effect on the economic contribution (Hypothesis 1.1 
is not supported).10
10 Because the cross-national dataset mixes long-term and short-term effects, 
I additionally ran an interaction model between parental leave and the presence 
of a preschool child. However, I could not find the short-term effect of maternity 
leave on the economic contribution using the dataset utilised in this analysis.
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Table 4. Determinants of Women’s Economic Contribution11
Individual-level Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Human Capital Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Woman with Higher Education 0,31 0,04 ** 0,18 0,04 ** 0,31 0,04 **
Woman’s Age 0,00 0,00 0,01 0,00 ** 0,00 0,00
Household Features
Number of Children -0,06 0,02 ** -0,06 0,02 ** -0,06 0,02 **
Presence of Preschool Child -0,25 0,05 ** -0,08 0,05 † -0,25 0,05 **
Household Income -0,05 0,02 ** -0,12 0,02 ** -0,05 0,02 **
Difference of Age (male-female ≥ 5) 0,11 0,04 ** 0,11 0,04 ** 0,11 0,04 
Other Female Factors
Woman in Labour Force 1,16 0,04 **
Preference 0,05 0,02 ** 0,02 0,02 0,07 0,04 †
Intercept 3,21 0,35 ** 3,31 0,37 ** 3,15 0,37 **
County-level Variable
Family Policy
Paid Leave -0,17 0,11 -0,19 0,12 -0,13 0,13
Public Education for Preschool Child 0,71 0,21 ** 0,21 0,23 0,76 0,25 **
% of Women’s in Part-time 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,01
Cross-level
Cross-level Interaction: Career Preference
*Paid Leave -0,02 0,03
*Public Education for Preschool Child -0,02 0,05
n(N countries) 6,449(27)
†p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01 (Two-sided test)
However, the effects of lifestyle preferences and public education for 
preschool children are not supported statistically when the “women 
in labour market” dummy variable is added. As Model 2 shows, 
when women work in the labour market, the contribution increases 
11 In order to maintain a plausible sample size, I omitted the two variables 
used in the previous study, “women more education” and “work-time limits”. 
The former is caused by a lack of information on the partner’s education in 
several countries, and the latter had an indifferent effect on the contribution 
according to Stier and Mandel (2009).
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dramatically (=+1.163); on the other hand, the effects of preferences 
and public education for preschool children disappear. Therefore, 
the working condition is a parameter of the economic contribution, 
which means that both women’s preferences and public education 
for preschool children affect women’s choice of whether to work or 
not, and then the work choices of women increase the economic 
contribution. In short, the choice to work is partly explained by 
the provision of public education for preschool children and partly 
by women’s lifestyle preferences. Lastly, Model 3 shows the cross-
national interaction effect, which examines how family policies 
moderate women’s career preferences. In line with Hypothesis 3, I 
expected that family policies would improve the career prospects 
of women, but in this analysis, neither maternity leave nor public 
childcare for preschool children had a moderation effect. Therefore, 
the relationship between lifestyle preferences and policies can barely 
be found in this analysis.
In sum, both lifestyle preferences and the implementation of 
family policies, especially public education for preschool children, 
are determinants of women’s economic contribution through 
participation in the labour market. Moreover, there is a possibility 
that women’s lifestyle preferences are affected by the availability 
of family policies, but this was not observed in this preliminary 
analysis. This might be explained by an inverse relationship—that is, 
the collective career preference of women creates the family policy 
in each country. Thus, a more detailed analysis is needed in order to 
clarify the relationship between the implementation of family policies 
and female lifestyle preferences. 
Discussion
Women’s economic contribution is mostly explained by whether they 
participate in the labour market or not. Under what conditions do 
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women continue to work? First, women consider their career if there 
are more public facilities for preschool children. Public pre-primary 
education facilities provide opportunities for women to work rather 
than remaining at home with their preschool children. Thus, women 
can decide to continue to work if more public education provision 
is available for preschool children. This result is relatively consistent 
with the work of Stier and Mandel (2009), although I take into 
consideration the East Asian countries, which were represented as 
countries where women are economically dependent. 
Furthermore, women’s preferences greatly affect their career 
choices. According to the descriptive statistics, more than half of 
women want to work rather than stay home: this is consistent with 
the preference theory introduced by Hakim (2000), which posits that 
a majority of women want to take both options—to work in the labour 
market and do domestic work. However, we should carefully consider 
the term “gender equality,” which is stated mostly as reducing the gap 
between men and women, since there is a significant ratio of women 
who prefer to stay at home rather than work in the labour market. Last, 
higher education has a significant effect on the contribution: women 
who have a higher education degree have a greater commitment, 
which suggests that women’s qualifications are properly utilised given 
the increase in income. Considering that female education levels have 
risen in recent years, the relative contribution gap might become even 
smaller in the future.
Finally, I would like to mention some limitations of this chapter. 
First, the main variable, women’s economic contribution, had only a 
seven-point scale, which should be calculated by both partners’ wages 
as previous studies have done.12 In addition, many respondents were 
omitted from this analysis because of the variables used. Hence, a 
12 Because of the small number of scales, ICC was quite low regardless of 
applying multi-level analysis. Thus, I needed to re-analyse with a plausible 
dataset as the next step.
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larger sample could be used in order to show more robust results. 
Second, there are some important outstanding questions, which, for 
example, could address how policy shifts or geographical features 
have an effect on economic contribution. These questions could 
be studied utilising different methodologies, such as panel data 
analysis or spatial analysis. Lastly, there is a need to consider the 
partner’s cooperation—for example, the division of household work 
(Brines 1994; Greenstein 2000), fatheroriented policies (Eydal & 
Rostgaard 2015) and equivalent determinants. In the main analysis, 
the household income and age difference are considered, but the 
demographics of the partner may have strong effects on the woman’s 
relative contribution. This should be considered carefully in future 
research.13
13 I would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers for their useful 
suggestions. Moreover, the data for this secondary analysis, “The International 
Social Survey Programme” (ISSP Research Group (2014), Family and Changing 
Gender Role IV—ISSP 2012), was provided by the GESIS Data Archive in 
Cologne.
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Crossing the boundary to Europe
Finns on transnational careers 
in the European Union
Saara Koikkalainen
Introduction
During the peak of the “European refugee crisis” (2015–2016), over 
one million asylum seekers crossed the Mediterranean to Italy and 
Greece or arrived to a European Union (EU) territory via Turkey and 
the Balkan states (Triandafyllidou 2017; UNHCR 2015). While people 
fleeing war, desperation and lack of opportunities in their home 
countries continues to be the most visible migration phenomena of 
today, there are also other forms of migration that shape our societies 
and have an impact on the European labour markets. Namely, Europe 
is home to a globally unique area, where sovereign states have given 
parts of their legislative power to supranational institutions and have 
given up one of the fundamental rights that define a nation state—
that of deciding who can cross its borders (e.g. Koikkalainen 2011; 
Recchi 2015). Different groups of migrants are on the move within the 
European free movement area: posted workers, skilled professionals, 
64
Saara Koikkalainen
Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds)
students and retirees move as European citizens who have the right 
to reside and settle anywhere within the countries belonging to the 
EU and the European Economic Area (EEA).1 This article examines 
one important form of contemporary migration that has increased 
in volume and importance in Europe in recent years, namely 
highly-skilled migration (e.g. Koikkalainen 2013a). The reasons for 
the increased interest are both economic and political: immigrants 
who arrive with higher education degrees and valuable professional 
skills are “not only economically advantageous but also politically 
acceptable” (Boeri 2012, 1). Based on the experiences of Finnish 
graduates, this study asks, why do young highly-skilled individuals 
choose to look for work abroad? Do they end up in precarious, 
temporary jobs below their skill level, or does their cultural capital 
transfer easily across borders? 
This chapter is based on research on the labour market experiences 
of 24–45-year-old university educated Finns who lived abroad in 12 
other EU member states.2 Finns follow the lure of London, go to study 
in Berlin, seize a job opportunity at the Euro-city Brussels or start 
their career as a trainee in Paris. They move also to many other cities 
in Europe, depending on their motivations, family situations and 
sometimes even pure coincidence of being offered a job abroad. Such 
1 Once the United Kingdom leaves the EU in 2020 and after the transitionary 
period is over, the landscape of intra-European migration will be significantly 
altered. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to discuss the possible 
implications of Brexit for highly-skilled migration in Europe. 
2 The study focused on those living abroad in the so-called EU15 countries 
that formed the EU when Finland joined in 1995. In my study, there were 
participants from 12 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom. There were no respondents from Greece, and the 
handful of respondents from Sweden were omitted from analysis because 
Sweden is historically the most important migration destination for Finns. 
This is especially true of Swedish-speaking Finns, and therefore, a somewhat 
different case than the mobility towards farther away Europe that characterised 
migration from Finland since the mid-1990s (see e.g. Korkiasaari & Tarkiainen 
2000).
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small and scattered migrant groups are a challenging population to 
study with survey methodology. Creating a random and statistically 
representative sample of the target population is not possible because 
there are no updated address registers. Hence, the participants were 
contacted via the Internet through expatriate networks. I administered 
two consecutive Working in Europe online surveys: the first in 2008 
(n=364) and the second in 2010 (n=194). Because the original survey 
data was collected before the global economic downturn, I decided 
to conduct a follow-up survey in 2010 to see whether the recession 
had a serious negative impact on the labour market situation of the 
respondents (for an assessment of the impact of the recession, see 
Koikkalainen 2017). The second survey was sent to those respondents 
who had volunteered their e-mail addresses in the first survey. In 
addition, I conducted 18 migrant interviews in 2011 via Skype among 
selected participants of the two surveys. 
The Finns who took part in the study included tertiary-educated 
consultants, finance managers, ICT-workers, post-doctoral scholars, 
freelance journalists, and self-employed language specialists, for 
example. Their intended stay abroad varied from that of a settler to that 
of a sojourner; from permanent emigration to short-time mobility. 
Also, the participants’ desire to integrate varied, as some were strongly 
rooted to the current home country, while others contemplated either 
returning to Finland or moving on to a new destination. Over two-
thirds of all respondents in the 2008 survey were female: there were 
280 female (77%) and 84 male (23%) respondents. Respondents who 
were single made up 27 percent, 45 percent were cohabiting, and 
28 percent were married. Most respondents (76%) did not have any 
children. The respondent average age was 32 years and they were 
fairly recent movers as 78 percent had moved abroad after the year 
2000. The educational background of the respondents was varied: 48 
percent had obtained their degree in Finland, 20 percent from abroad, 
and 25 percent had a degree from two countries. Seven percent of 
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them were still studying. A clear majority of the respondents (87%) 
were from five countries: United Kingdom, Germany, Belgium, 
France and Spain.
Finns living in other European countries are a small group in 
terms of their numbers, but in many other respects, they are similar 
to the “pioneers of European integration” (Recchi & Favell 2009) 
originating from the larger EU member states. All intra-EU movers 
are not highly-skilled, nor do they all come from elite backgrounds. 
Groups facing discrimination, such as the Roma from Eastern Europe, 
are on the move along with the well-earning retirees, posted workers, 
university students and young professionals (e.g. Barslund & Busse 
2016; Favell, Recchi, Kuhn, Jensen, & Klein 2011). Yet all European 
citizens are privileged when compared with migrants and refugees 
originating from outside Europe: they are entitled to equal treatment 
regardless of where they live, and at least in principle, they should face 
no discrimination. The legal rights and sense of belonging provided 
by European citizenship also makes them stakeholders in their 
respective countries of residence without the necessity of applying 
for national citizenship or aiming for full integration (Koikkalainen 
2019). An analysis of how highly-skilled migrants, such as the Finns 
in this study, manage to build their lives and careers abroad can shed 
light to how the EU works as a transnational space and how mobility 
features in the working life today. Why did these migrants cross the 
boundary from a national labour market to Europe, and how did 
their careers progress as a result?
Leaving Finland
Mobility from Finland to other European countries increased 
significantly after Finland joined the EEA in 1994 and the EU in 
1995. During the past 10 years, the favourite destinations of Finns 
have been Sweden, United Kingdom, United States, Germany and 
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Spain. During this time, an average of 9,400 Finnish citizens moved 
abroad each year, and more than 6,500 of them (69%) chose one of the 
EU member states as their destination (years 2007–2016) (Statistics 
Finland 2018). While at the micro level, the motivations and paths of 
these migrants are highly diverse and individual, various historical 
processes, cultural phenomena and economic developments influence 
the reasons why particular individuals decided to move, where they 
moved to and when they moved. At the background influencing such 
mobility lie different macro and meso-level processes and factors 
(Castles, de Haas, & Miller 2014). Most importantly, these include 
processes related to economic and cultural globalisation and to 
Europeanisation.
Globalisation played a role in how highly-skilled Finns in the 1990s, 
along with their peers in many other Western countries, began to 
imagine their personal futures and working careers spanning outside 
of their country of birth. The concentration of professional jobs in 
key nodes of the global economy, and the new career opportunities 
in multinational companies, offered the promise of a prosperous and 
exciting life abroad. At the same time, technical advances, such as 
the Internet with its numerous ways to connect and engage in real 
time across great distances, have also made the world feel “smaller”. 
The ease of communication, affordable travel and increased global 
inter-connectedness significantly influenced the kinds of career 
choices that were available for Finnish university graduates. The 
unique European area of free movement was already fully in place 
when Finland joined the EEA and the EU in the mid-1990s, and the 
Finnish telecommunication company Nokia was becoming a global 
player in the mobile phone business. As European citizens, the young 
graduates were able to look for their fortunes abroad and the numbers 
of those who did so rose after Finland recovered from the economic 
recession of the early 1990s (Koikkalainen 2013a). 
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Many moved abroad for the first time with the help of the 
European Socrates-Erasmus (currently known as Erasmus+) exchange 
programme, which has facilitated the mobility of more than 5 million 
students, apprentices and volunteers since its inception in 1987 
(European Commission 2017). Finland typically ranks among the 
top five sending countries in Europe, when the numbers of outgoing 
students is compared with the overall student population (European 
Commission 2016). Starting from the internationalisation boom of 
the 1990s in Finnish higher education (Garam 2003), the importance 
of gaining international experience has been frequently repeated in 
the media. The students and young graduates have the knowledge of 
possibilities for internationalisation and transnational mobility and 
an awareness of how to grasp the opportunity when it presents itself. 
In addition, the numbers of those completing degrees abroad have 
been rising. In 2006–2007, approximately 4,000 Finnish students 
were enrolled in degree studies abroad. During the academic year 
2015–2016, their numbers doubled and reached nearly 8,000 students, 
equal to the average student enrolment of a small Finnish university 
(CIMO 2017).3 
While the increased mobility from Finland takes place within 
the larger context of globalisation and Europeanisation combined 
with the country’s unique migration history, there is still room for 
considerable individual agency. Often the motivation to move because 
of studies or career progress were combined with love and personal 
relationships or simply the desire to see the world. Many participants 
of the study explained that they wanted to move abroad to encounter 
new things, get a better quality of life or live in the home country 
of their spouse. Some explained that they ended up abroad as if by 
3 The Finnish Social Insurance Institution Kela gives financial aid to students 
who complete degrees in either Finnish or foreign higher education institutions. 
The figures refer to the numbers of students who have received student aid 
abroad. There are no other official statistics on degree students abroad. 
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accident when they took on a job opportunity that suddenly presented 
itself, while others said they had always known that they would one 
day move abroad. All participants of the study had lived, worked, 
studied, or at least travelled abroad before moving to the country 
where they lived during the first survey. They thus had “mobility 
capital” (e.g. Findlay, King, Stam, & Ruiz-Gelices 2006; Murphy-
Lejeune 2003), which has been shown to increase the likelihood of 
further transnational mobility. The migration experience itself can 
also be an important element in enhancing one’s “career capital” 
(Habti 2012, 31, 92; Jokinen, Brewster, & Suutari 2008). 
Economic theories of migration stress the importance of wage 
differentials and standards of living as the causes of human mobility. 
However, even though a majority of the respondents estimated their 
wages in the destination country to be higher than in Finland, a 
closer look at their motivations reveals that money was not the main 
or only incentive for migration. For these educated Finns, moving 
abroad is a possibility, not a matter of survival, or of maximising the 
family’s income, as it may be for many of those who cross national 
borders to work in the Global North to send remittances back home 
to the Global South. Based on his study on mobility within Europe, 
Hubert Krieger (2004, 36) argues that “increasing national wealth 
goes hand in hand with an increase in personal and family motives 
for migration”. This conclusion resonates also with Finnish migration 
history: while in the 1960s and 1970s, those who moved to Sweden 
were perhaps mostly attracted by higher salaries and standard of 
living (e.g. Korkiasaari & Tarkiainen 2000), the Finns who move 
today may do so more for adventure or lifestyle reasons.
Finding work abroad
Previous research into the labour market integration of highly-skilled 
migrants has identified several barriers to finding employment in the 
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country of destination. These include lack of language skills, non-
recognition of foreign educational titles and lack of country-specific 
knowledge and experience (Schittenhelm & Schmidtke 2011), lack 
of specific local capital and resources, the difficulty of navigating 
in a new structural and institutional context (Zikic, Bonache, & 
Cerdin 2010, 670), unfamiliarity with local labour market rules, and 
having a foreign habitus (Bauder 2005). Education from abroad has 
been found to correlate with the difficulties of labour market entry, 
as it tends to be less valued than local degrees (e.g. Friedberg 2000; 
Saarikallio, Hellsten, & Juutilainen 2008). Nohl, Ofner and Thomsen 
(2010) use the concept of “status passage” to describe the transitional 
period between exiting the labour market of the country of origin, or 
graduating from an institution of higher education, and integrating 
into the labour market of the country of destination.
For the participants of this study, however, these factors had 
not been major obstacles to labour market entry in the country of 
destination. While the transition through the status passage had 
been slow for some, a clear majority of the respondents had found 
a satisfactory job rather quickly. At the time of the first survey in 
2008 (n=364), nearly 80 percent of the respondents were in full-time 
employment, and only three percent were currently unemployed or 
looking for work. During the two years separating the two surveys, 
the situation had changed for some of the respondents: they had 
returned to Finland, moved on, started a family or changed jobs. 
Despite the global economic downturn, which began in the autumn 
of 2008, the change was not generally for the worse. Only 17 percent 
of the respondents explained that their labour market situation 
had worsened from the spring of 2008, while 25 percent said it had 
improved and 58 percent reported no remarkable change due to the 
recession. During the second survey in 2010 (n=194), therefore, over 60 
percent of the respondents were in full-time employment, while only 
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four percent were looking for work. At both times, a sizeable number4 
of respondents were also working as freelancers, self-employed, or in 
part-time jobs alternating between family duties, studying, and work. 
The transition to the destination country labour market had, 
therefore, mostly been smooth. Those who had encountered problems 
were a small minority: in the 2008 survey, only four percent stated 
that they had not found employment in the new country that matched 
their degree, while another four percent said that they had been 
unemployed and had looked for work for longer than six months. 
Nearly eighty percent had found work within weeks: either before or 
immediately after moving or after graduating from a local institution. 
The respondents were also asked to compare their current country 
with Finland on a number of claims related to their labour market 
position. The respondents were rather content with their situation in 
the new country: 70 percent completely or somewhat agree that their 
salary is better than it would have been in Finland, 79 percent state 
that their job fits their qualifications and 77 percent that their degree 
and previous job experience is recognised. Being foreign had not been 
a major obstacle in finding work: only 11 percent report having faced 
discrimination. 
The respondents were also asked to evaluate the impact of the 
move abroad on their career. The responses can be classified into 
three categories. First, those who thought the move had clearly been 
beneficial, second, those for whom the move had caused a downturn 
in their career and third, those who were ambivalent about the 
effects of the move. About 70 percent of the participants belonged 
to the first category. New experiences, increased language and 
intercultural communication skills, interesting job assignments, and 
the sheer amount of different employment opportunities available 
were noted as signs of labour market success. Those who stated that 
4 10 percent in selected one of these options in the 2008 survey, and 19 percent 
in the 2010 survey.
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the move had negative consequences for their career shared some 
common characteristics. Stepping off the beaten track that heads for 
London, Brussels, or the other large European cities that host many 
international job opportunities had been somewhat risky. Looking 
for work in the smaller cities of France, Italy, Spain or Austria, for 
example, makes you compete in a more restricted and national labour 
market with the local graduates who have the benefit of having an 
easily recognised degree, perfect language skills, and local networks 
and social capital that are highly beneficial for finding employment.
Most of the survey respondents were content with the life choices 
that they had made, and in that respect, they do not differ from the 
results gained in other studies: all groups of intra-EU movers express 
a higher level of life satisfaction than comparable samples of nationals 
of their country of origin (Recchi 2008, 218). The Finns of this study 
had found several ways in which to communicate their skills and 
knowledge in the destination country labour market and were thus 
satisfied with their situation, even if considerable adaptation was 
often required when they first moved to the new country. There are 
numerous ways in which to “make it abroad”, to find a good life and 
a new home for oneself in Europe, where national borders no longer 
restrict one’s choice of place of residence.
Conclusions
Recent research has stressed the diversity of motivations for intra-
European mobility (Favell 2008; King & Okólski 2019; Recchi 2015; 
Santacreu, Baldoni, & Albert 2009; Strey, Fajt, Mortimer Dubow, & 
Siegel 2018; Verwiebe 2014). For internationally minded, relatively 
young and well-educated European citizens, mobility in the EU/
EEA area is one possible labour market path among many and 
experimenting with living abroad is a choice that may or may not lead 
to a longer-term settlement. While the European citizens who live and 
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work abroad in other EU member states are still the exception, living 
a transnational life in Europe and engaging in various cross-border 
practices is becoming an accepted way of building one’s career and 
planning one’s future because maintaining contact across borders is 
increasingly easy (see e.g. Favell et al. 2011).
Europe as an area where “international migration” resembles 
“internal mobility” (e.g. Favell 2008; Recchi & Triandafyllidou 2010) 
does, therefore, seem to exist for at least some Europeans. The idea is 
echoed also with the participants of my study: moving abroad was not 
understood as a final decision because a return to Finland was always 
a possibility if things did not work out in the destination country. Up 
to a third of the Working in Europe survey respondents had already 
previously lived in three or more countries outside of Finland. 
Some of the respondents had taken every possible opportunity at 
internationalisation: going on student exchange while still at school, 
studying abroad with the Erasmus programme while at university 
and working at Disneyland Paris or as an au pair in London during 
the holidays. Such mobile Europeans can at least superficially blend 
in the new country of residence and take their mobility rights for 
granted.
International migration often signifies a transitional phase in 
the work career of the migrant. The mobile individual may have to 
make a fresh start in her career, and the situation can be perceived 
either as a crisis or as an opportunity. Especially those who have to 
make the migration decision without any prior knowledge of a job in 
the destination country have to take the risk of a possible downturn 
in their career if they are unsuccessful in finding work that would 
match their degree and work experience. All types of knowledge 
are not equally valued: some are more mobile and easier to transfer 
and translate than others, and the valorisation of different types of 
knowledge and skills is often linked to occupations, status positions 
and gender (Kofman 2013; Ryan, Erel, & D’Angelo 2015). 
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The participants of the study share the experience of looking for 
work or working in a situation where they belong to a minority and 
must operate by the rules of a labour market that is largely unknown. 
To avoid losing out on their career they have had to try to negotiate the 
best possible value for their credentials and previous work experience. 
Many chose to highlight the fact that they are different from the local 
job applicants so that their foreign background could be seen as 
an asset, and not an obstacle to finding employment. Working in a 
foreign language in a multicultural context has demanded adaptation 
and flexibility from all the participants regardless of their educational 
background or profession (Koikkalainen 2013b). 
Despite the fact that most countries are ready to welcome highly-
skilled migrants as the only truly accepted migrants of today 
(Raghuram 2004), tertiary education is no guarantee for a trouble-free 
entry to the destination country labour market even for the European 
citizens exercising their right to free movement. As the results of this 
study demonstrate, highly-skilled Finns do not face insurmountable 
barriers when they enter the labour market of another EU country, 
but they are also not welcomed with open arms as brains gained: 
finding a highly-skilled job in the country of destination demands 
adaptation, perseverance and sometimes even a total re-orientation 
of one’s career. 
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Examining the role of institutions in 
shaping migrant reproductive labour
Merita Jokela
Introduction
This chapter deals with paid reproductive work, a sector that is 
strongly linked with the global movement of labour and the changing 
boundaries of work. The demand for migrant care work has grown 
rapidly in the past decades. According to the ILO (2018), 67 million 
people around the globe move inside and across borders to work 
in private households as nannies, maids and carers for the elderly 
and disabled, filling the gap between state and market in ensuring 
households’ reproduction in the receiving countries. The emigration 
and migration of domestic and care workers is, in many countries, 
encouraged through different state-level agreements and programs 
specially targeted for recruitment into domestic and care related jobs. 
Research on female migration and movement of labour has 
predominantly concentrated on the questions related to care givers’ 
and care recipients’ families and the “global care chains” (Hochschild 
2000; Parreñas Salazar 2000) and recently also on the structures 
and policies that shape the demand and provision of reproductive 
labour (e.g. Bettio, Simonazzi, & Villa 2006; Carbonnier & Morel 
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2015; Kofman 2014; Kvist 2012; Van Hooren 2017; Williams & 
Gavanas 2008; Williams 2012). However, the impact of the policies 
on labour markets and migrant reproductive workers has received 
less attention. This chapter sheds light on the issue by reviewing the 
insights on studies that connect the politics of labour migration and 
migrant reproductive labour. Using primarily previous case studies 
as my sources, I explore the different rationales of migration policies 
related to paid reproductive labour and the intersecting ways in which 
these shape the position of migrant reproductive workers. The three 
rationales I study here are neoliberal ideologies, temporary migration 
and contradictory politics. 
Being a female dominated sector, paid domestic and care work 
is strongly related to gender norms and the gendered division of 
social reproduction. Macro-level studies on domestic and care 
work mostly focus on the social, political and economic structures 
that shape the inequalities of the women in the sector (Jokela 2015; 
Kvist 2012; Williams 2012). While gender matters, it does not always 
matter in the same way. Transnational feminist theories suggest that 
intersectional identities including class, nationality, ethnicity and 
race are equally important when analysing ways that inequalities are 
reproduced (Crenshaw 1991; Mohanty 2003). Intersectional analysis 
has been applied not only to identify inequalities among migrant 
domestic workers but also to understand their agency and personal 
experiences and aspirations (e.g. Gibson, Law, & McKay 2001; Näre 
2014). The main focus of this chapter is not on the micro but the 
macro-level, that is, the institutional mechanisms that enable millions 
of migrant women to move across borders and the interplay between 
migration policies and the inequalities related to the position of 
migrant domestic workers on a global scale. The chapter is structured 
as follows: firstly, I describe the social, demographic and economic 
structures of migrant reproductive labour. Secondly, I discuss the role 
of institutions and policies in shaping migrant reproductive labour 
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and thirdly, I present concluding remarks on the issue and discuss 
alternative policy choices.
Female migration and paid reproductive labour
Migration of paid domestic labour is not a recent phenomenon. In 
the mid-20th century, it was common in European cities to recruit 
migrants from rural areas to work as maids and nannies in urban 
households. This is still a current phenomenon in many less affluent 
countries where rural-urban migration continues to exist on a large 
scale (D’Souza 2010; Razavi 2007). However, the migration flows of 
present day increasingly move across borders, often following the 
historical colonial patterns and feeding the supply of paid domestic 
labour (Tronto 2006). 
Migrant reproductive work has traditionally been analysed in the 
context of global movement of labour, gendered division of social 
reproduction and the global inequalities that are (re)produced in 
these processes. The “transnationalisation of care” (e.g. Yeates 2011) 
refers to a social process that connects people, institutions and places 
across borders and creates a mobile workforce for domestic services 
(Yeates 2011; see also Mahon & Robinson 2011; Parreñas Salazar 
2001). 
The literature on care migration usually highlights theories on push 
and pull effects to explain the movement of migrant care workers. The 
push effects of women’s migration from East to West and from South 
to North are said to rise from economic reasons, such as low wages, 
unemployment and poverty, but also violence (see Triandafyllidou 
2013). The pull factors consist of several social, demographic and 
economic developments. Previous studies suggest that both the 
increase in women’s labour force participation and population ageing 
create demand for migrant labour (Anderson 2000; Estévez-Abe 
2015; Lister et al. 2007). In addition, cuts in public provision of care 
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services have forced households to seek for other alternatives, such 
as private domestic and care services, thus contributing to the rising 
need for migrant reproductive workers. Furthermore, it has also been 
shown that paid domestic labour is still strongly related to economic 
inequalities within countries that create both demand and supply for 
private domestic and care services (Jokela 2015; Milkman, Reese, & 
Roth 1998).
While female migration is often linked with economic hardship, 
in reality, the individual decisions to migrate are often more complex 
than simply a sum of push and pull factors. Instead of seeing female 
migrant workers as passive victims, alternative feminist approaches 
emphasise the different situations of migrant women and the possible 
positive changes of migration, such as increasing autonomy, following 
individual aspirations and gaining international experience (Gibson, 
Law, & McKay 2001; Näre 2014; Pratt 2005a, 2005b). 
The role of institutions and policies in 
shaping migrant reproductive labour
A growing number of scholars in the social sciences examine the 
role of institutions and policies in shaping migrant reproductive 
labour, suggesting that the sector is shaped by different policy 
areas, including employment, care, gender and migration policies 
(Bettio et al. 2006; Hellgren 2015; Shutes & Chiatti 2012; Williams 
& Gavanas 2008; Williams 2011). In many affluent countries, paid 
domestic work is supported through specific policies to either attract 
foreign domestic workers, or to regulate the already existing migrant 
domestic labour force. While the policies seek to create new jobs 
and reduce unemployment, especially among marginalized groups, 
they are criticised for legitimising the commodification of care and 
emphasising families’ responsibility (Kvist & Peterson 2010; Williams 
2011; Carbonnier & Morel 2015). Furthermore, some studies highlight 
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the role of institutions in sustaining the precariousness of domestic 
workers through unequal policy measures (Hellgren 2015; Jokela 
2017; van Hooren 2011; Williams 2012).
The politics of migration policies that are the focus of this chapter 
are complex, and there are a number of political and institutional 
dimensions that are viewed as contributing to the status of migrant 
workers. I concentrate here on three particular rationales (Figure 
1): neoliberal ideologies, temporary migration and contradictory 
politics. These rationales are not separate categories but overlapping: 
neoliberal ideologies, such as flexibilisation of labour markets 
and privatisation of social and care services, create demand and 
opportunities for temporary migration. Contradictory politics may 
be derived from a situation where temporary movement of migrant 
workforce is encouraged through “no policy”, and contradictory 
politics may also be seen as outcome of neoliberal ideologies. 
Neoliberal ideologies and temporary migration
Neoliberal ideologies of receiving countries are seen as the main 
drivers of the labour migration of low-skilled workers, such as 
domestic workers. Neoliberal ideologies generally emphasise the 
market, financial liberalisation, deregulation, flexibilisation of 
Figure 1. The role of institutions and policies in shaping migrant reproductive labour
Contradictory politics
• No policy: demand for 
(migrant) workers but no 
regulation exists
• Work permit programmes 
only cover high status 
care work
Neoliberal ideologies
• Global expansion of 
capital
• Decentralisation and 
flexibilisation of labour 
markets
• Privatisation of social and 
care services
Temporary migration
• Circular migration 
• Caregiver-programmes
• Tied visa -systems
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labour markets and privatisation of welfare services (Standing 2014; 
Kalleberg & Hewison 2012). Literature highlights the state’s role 
in facilitating transnational capital accumulation, with irregular 
migration as an element of this process (De Genova 1998; McNevin 
2006; Sassen 2008). Irregular migrants fit particularly well in the 
setting as they often accept lower wages and working conditions and 
are also easily deportable if market fluctuations change (McNevin 
2006). According to Sassen (2008), globalisation together with 
national interests, has produced global markets at the top and bottom 
of the economic system: at the top is located the transnational market 
for high-level managerial and professional talent across economic 
sectors, while the bottom is occupied by a variety of (mostly) informal 
flows, including migrant domestic and care labour and the “global 
care chains” (Sassen 2008). At the national level, Bettio et al. (2006) 
point out that neoliberal policies also shape the care markets through 
deregularisation, marketisation and privatisation of social and care 
services. Thus, states shift the responsibility of reproduction back 
to families and facilitate the use of a cheap migrant workforce. In 
countries such as Italy and Spain that favour home-based care, the 
migrant-in-the-family model has become a preferred solution for 
households (Bettio et al. 2006). 
The temporary movement of workforce is seen as a part of 
transnational labour processes that entail a variety of migratory 
flows, such as workers sent to the host country by their employers 
that are often international companies, seasonal workers (especially 
in agriculture) and migrants who commute between countries. One 
form of temporary movement is the concept of circular migration, 
which is used in migration research to refer to regular and systematic 
movement of migrants who move back and forth between countries 
to seek work (Skeldon 2012). In paid reproductive labour, a growing 
number of women circulate between their home and host country 
without permanently moving abroad. This is particularly the case 
Examining the role of institutions in shaping migrant reproductive labour
85Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life
between the neighbouring countries of Eastern and Western Europe 
(Lutz & Palenga-Möllenbeck 2012; Marchetti 2013; Triandafyllidou 
2013). 
Due to the increasing movement of labour across borders, the 
concept of circular migration has gained attention in policy debates 
especially in Europe. This type of migration is often promoted as a 
“triple win” by the receiving and sending countries as well as the 
migrant workers themselves, who are able to circulate due to specific 
agreements such as free movement in the EU. This policy discourse 
emphasises the positive impact of circular migration because it can 
simultaneously act as a buffer during periods of economic volatility 
and provide employers with a flexible labour force. However, critics 
often warn that circular migration should not be integrated in the 
policy arena because it is difficult to separate from other forms of 
temporary migration (Skeldon 2012). Despite the regular demand for 
migrant reproductive labour, it is feared that states would emphasise 
the temporary nature of migration and push policies that limit the 
rights of migrant workers. 
There are a number of policies targeted specifically to recruit 
migrant reproductive workers, often on a temporary basis. These 
programmes are most prevalent in South-East-Asia, Europe and 
Canada. Historically, migrant care worker programmes in Canada 
were initiated to respond to temporary demand for a foreign labour 
force (Michel & Peng 2012). The characteristics of the programmes 
vary. However, they all entail a number of rules and regulations that 
restrict the recruitment of migrant domestic and care labour. Canada 
continues to recruit migrant care workers through the Live-in 
Caregiver programme; however, domestic workers are not necessarily 
required to live in the employer’s household.1 Furthermore, it is 
1 This requirement was partly removed from Canada’s Live-in Caregiver 
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currently possible for a domestic worker to apply for permanent 
residency after 24 months. Contrary to Canada, migrant domestic 
workers in other countries, such as Taiwan, are only allowed to live 
with their employer and to work in the domestic and care service 
sector. 
This kind of “tied visa” system also exists in the UK, where 
domestic workers who enter the country with their employers (mostly 
from the Gulf countries) are not allowed to change the employer nor 
extend their six months visa while in the country (Anderson 2015). 
Japan and Korea have introduced migrant care worker programmes 
in recent years to attract workers from other Asian countries. 
However, the programmes are still modest in their size, especially 
in Japan where entry rules for migrant care workers are restricted 
(see Michel & Peng 2012). Similarly to other countries, migrant care 
workers in Japan and Korea are mainly seen as temporary workers 
who eventually will return to their home countries, not as a potential 
future labour force (Song 2015). 
Another example of immigrant policies is Italy. With at least half 
a million foreign care workers, the country adopted an ex-post facto 
regularisation of undocumented workers to provide them access 
to formal labour markets. In 2009, asylum was granted to 200,000 
paperless migrants working in the domestic and care sector (Finotelli 
& Arango 2011). Still, the regularisation campaigns have only 
covered part of the workers and many others remain undocumented 
and informal (Bettio et al. 2006; Shutes & Chiatti 2012). Parallel to 
the non-EU migrants, many Italian households employ women from 
Eastern-European countries who often work in Italy as circular 
migrants (Marchetti 2013).
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Contradictory politics
Despite the demand for migrant labour, states may not always 
directly promote the inflows of foreign workers due to contradictory 
political interests. As neoliberal markets profit from temporary and 
precarious migrant labour, policies may even deliberately be designed 
to not regularise migrant labour. For example, Castles (2004) 
argues that in order to balance the preferences of different interest 
groups, governments may even provide anti-immigration rhetoric, 
while at the same time supporting policies to encourage labour 
migration. These “hidden agendas”, as Castles suggests, explain the 
contradictory outcomes of some immigration policies, including 
migrant reproductive labour. Michel and Peng (2012) call this type 
of policy a policy of “demand and denial”: demand for paid domestic 
and care work is created mostly due to insufficient policies, but the 
entry to formal labour markets is denied through strict regulations 
(Michel & Peng 2012; see also Song 2015). The “no policy” approach 
has for years been a common way to respond to the growing demand 
for paid household services not only in the US but also in many 
countries that recently have introduced programmes to regulate the 
sector, such as Germany and Italy (see Jokela 2017). While regulation 
exists, welfare states are criticised for deliberately overlooking the 
existence of undeclared work performed by migrant care workers 
(Lutz 2012). May et al. (2007, 162), whose study concentrates on the 
UK, consider the state taking a direction in the immigration policy 
“in which migrant workers are treated less as potential citizens than 
units of labour, the supply of which can (in theory at least) be turned 
on and off”.
Most of the studies mentioned above highlight the precarious 
position of migrant reproductive workers and their status as 
partial citizens. Migrant workers in many countries often remain 
undocumented and perform their work without any access to legal 
benefits. Furthermore, paid domestic labour is viewed as low skilled 
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and “easily done by anyone”, which makes the status of migrant 
domestic workers particularly vulnerable and easily replaceable 
(Anderson 2015). Policies, such as the migration programmes 
presented earlier in this chapter, are generally viewed to enforce the 
precariousness of migrant reproductive workers. 
It is often noted that while workers and their families benefit from 
higher salaries and better quality of life in the host country, restricted 
legal rights and lack of recognition still force migrant reproductive 
workers and their families to vulnerable situations (Parreñas Salazar 
2001; Tronto 2011). For example, in the US, work permits offered for 
foreign workers of specific occupations only cover higher educated 
health and care workers but exclude low-skilled jobs, such as 
domestic and care workers (Song 2015). According to Dwyer (2013), 
the division of care labour into skilled and unskilled is intentional 
and strongly linked to ethnic inequalities: in the care sector, migrant 
workers are specifically recruited for low-skilled jobs while native 
workers usually occupy the care work jobs that require higher 
skills and are better paid (Dwyer 2013, see also Duffy, Albelda, & 
Hammonds 2013). It has been shown that workers in low-skilled care 
jobs and with migrant backgrounds are more likely to work under 
precarious working conditions and receive lower wages compared to 
other workers (Jokela 2019; Lightman 2019). Hence, the work permit 
system favouring high skilled care workers enforces the racial and 
ethnic division of reproductive labour (Glenn 1992) as it divides 
the sector in professional and skilled and nonprofessional unskilled 
jobs, the latter having less labour market power or opportunities to 
improve their wages. Furthermore, Geraldine Pratt underlines in 
her study (2005b) on the Canadian Caregiver programme Filipina 
women’s own experiences and the ways that social networks and 
familial obligations—not economic or individual factors related to 
occupational status or wages—shape migrant workers’ lives. She 
concludes that despite the financial and personal gains and the 
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permanent status provided for migrant reproductive workers after 24 
months, the personal costs are often too high for many women. Here, 
Pratt mainly refers to the negative consequences of family dislocation 
in the lives of the migrant women living abroad.
Discussion
This chapter has explored different rationales of migration policies 
and the ways these shape the status of migrant reproductive workers 
and particularly contribute to their unequal position in the labour 
markets and in society in general. As shown in the review of previous 
literature, a number of programmes are designed to regulate migrant 
reproductive labour in different countries. Due to limited space, 
it was not possible to present the programmes more thoroughly; 
however, general conclusions on global trends may be drawn based 
on previous studies. Firstly, neoliberal ideologies are commonly 
criticised on the macro-level for creating policies that are designed 
to benefit the households while migrant workers are only seen as 
replacements during temporary labour shortages. Secondly, country-
level case studies show how strongly migrant care worker policies 
tend to emphasise the temporary position of migrant reproductive 
workers by practices such as the tied-visa system. Thirdly, the anti-
immigration attitudes of different interest groups and citizens 
contribute to the precariousness of migrant workers as they make 
governments reluctant to officially promote labour migration. Still, 
due to high demand for a migrant labour force these practices of 
“no policy as policy” allow the inflow of migrant workers without 
regularisation processes. 
As both micro and macro-level studies have shown, the 
inequalities and precariousness of migrant reproductive labour are 
multi-faceted phenomena. While this chapter concentrated on the 
role of institutions in shaping the situation of migrant reproductive 
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workers, I also acknowledge the complexities of migratory processes 
and consider the agency of migrant reproductive workers that is 
emphasised in transnational feminist approaches. Not all migrant 
workers are victims and not all of them are equally vulnerable. 
Policies that encourage migrant reproductive labour may be targeted 
to households, but it would be too simplistic to argue that on the 
individual level, households are the only ones who benefit from them: 
migrant care worker programmes, enable a change for many women 
who also view domestic and care work as a stepping stone into the 
labour market. In the absence of state support, many women rely on 
social networks that often also act as recruitment channels. 
However, on the policy level, the question of inequality becomes 
crucial and as the discussion above shows, there exists a paradox 
related to the status of migrant reproductive labour that is difficult 
to overcome: improved conditions in the domestic work sector would 
require professionalisation, but migrant workers are specifically 
wanted for their “unskilled” labour and thus have to deal with limited 
rights and insecurity. This paradox raises questions not only on 
migrant women’s rights as citizens and workers but also, as noted in 
many studies before, on the quality of domestic and care work. 
In this chapter, I only used a few examples to illustrate the nature 
of migration policies related to paid reproductive labour. Many other 
countries have introduced policies not necessarily targeted to the 
supply, but to the demand of paid domestic and care work. Recent 
policy reforms, particularly in Northern European countries, such 
as tax reductions or service vouchers for households purchasing 
domestic services, have been widely criticised for “bringing back” 
the traditional maids and for only benefiting wealthier households. 
However, I argue that especially in countries where direct and 
informal relationships are common, policies aimed at households, if 
well designed, could act as enforcement strategies for domestic and 
care workers’ labour rights. Widespread informality is described as 
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one of the greatest challenges in domestic services as migrant workers 
working in low-skilled occupations remain in informal jobs. Offering 
incentives for households to comply with the law could contribute to 
more formal job contracts and more security for domestic and care 
workers in general. This is only one example of how institutions may 
shape the position of migrant reproductive workers. I suggest that 
in future research, more attention should be paid on institutional 
strategies in order to reduce inequalities related to paid domestic and 
care work. Moreover, to promote the rights of migrant reproductive 
workers, researchers and policymakers should consider the diverse 
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Polish posted workers in the 
transnational space of subcontracting




“So for whom do you work?” I asked Adam1, a Polish quality-control 
specialist posted at one of Europe’s biggest construction sites, the 
Olkiluoto 3 power plant in Finland. “Well, we are all working for 
Energia, but we are actually employed by Constructor”, Adam told 
me. I had a rough idea of the company Adam might work for, but 
was curious about how he saw his employment relations: Olkiluoto 
has been notorious for its complex and controversial subcontracting 
arrangements (Lillie & Sippola 2011). Adam specified two of his 
Polish employers but did not mention two other companies that 
operated on top of Energia and thus were his indirect employers: a 
French–German consortium that was managing Olkiluoto and the 
1 All the names of research participants and companies are pseudonyms.
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Finnish nuclear power company TVO, which subcontracted work to 
that consortium.
In the classical Marxist notion of class struggle inherent to the 
capitalist system, workers remain in relations of exploitation with a 
clear-cut employer. The employer extracts the workers’ labour effort 
and asserts dominance over them through the ability to hire and fire, 
among other ways (Wright 2005). Subcontracting dilutes the class 
relations between labour and capital by creating a chain of employers 
who are in employment relationships with each other while also in a 
work relationship with the labourers. Transnational subcontracting, 
entailing employment of workers from abroad through subcontracting 
companies, dilutes class relations even further (Lillie 2006, 2012; 
Lillie & Sippola 2011). It casts doubt on who the real employer is and 
what that employer’s obligations and responsibilities to the workers 
are. Adam signed the contract without clear knowledge of what a 
posting in Finland legally entails. He knew that the contractual salary 
exceeded his monthly income in Poland several times over and did not 
enquire further. He suspected, however, that the subcontracting chain 
is created to favour the company “bosses” and not the employees. 
In this article, I discuss various aspects of posted workers’ 
relations with their direct and principal employers. The analysis aids 
in understanding both how the workers themselves try to make sense 
of the power relations behind the transnational subcontracting and 
their subjective ideas about what exploitation and justice are in a 
transnational space. The article thereby shows what the workers see 
when they do not see the full employment picture and when direct 
interaction is dispersed across their various employers. 
There is a substantial body of scholarship on the legislative 
and social-policy framework of posted work and transnational 
subcontracting. The discussion focuses on the ways in which 
transnational subcontracting allows the companies to externalise 
risk and shift the costs of flexible adjustments to the subcontracting 
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party and how the subcontractor, in turn, attempts to circumvent 
regulations (alongside Lillie’s work, see Cremers 2011). Workers’ 
perception of these complex employment relations and the 
heterogeneity of cultural and employment contexts to the workers’ 
experiences are given less attention. 
I argue here for a more in-depth and culturally nuanced picture 
of posting, in which, firstly, the transnational context of living affects 
workers’ sense of exploitation and their perception of the employment 
relations (Sayer 2004) and, secondly, workers’ moral estimation of 
their employers is complicated by the diffused responsibility inherent 
to the subcontracting system. In my account, I draw on ethnographic 
fieldwork I have conducted intermittently since 2007 among Polish 
posted workers in Finland. I also refer to three interviews done in 
Poland with workers posted to Norway. My interlocutors include 
blue-collar workers in shipyards and the construction industry 
along with engineers and technicians. In geographical terms, the 
paper focuses on the Nordic context, especially Finland, but I make 
reference to other countries too, following my interlocutors’ global 
work experience. 
The moral map of posting
The regime of mobility for posted work in the European Union 
was created to let workers take less protective regulatory regimes 
with them and hence encourage competition and internal-market 
integration (Leczykiewicz 2014). This implies transnational mobility 
from one precarious context to another; however, my interlocutors 
notice that sites differ in the amount of precariousness workers take 
with them. Through personal and second-hand knowledge, they 
draw what could be called a moral map of posting, indicating Norway 
and Finland as having the best-quality contracts, while Germany 
and the Netherlands have the worst. Although workers never use 
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the term “principal contractor”, I would argue that they apply this 
moral mapping as a mental shorthand for the hierarchy of principal 
contractors who contribute to good or poor contractual working 
conditions. Caro, Berntsen, Lillie and Wagner (2015) noticed similar 
country preferences among interviewees in their study of posted 
workers in Finland, Norway and Germany. The authors ascribe these 
to the well-enforced, extended collective agreements in the Nordic 
countries, with implied importance of salaries. However, my fieldwork 
indicates that more enters in than the pay. Salaries boost the already 
positive image of Finland and especially of Norway, but low salaries 
are not the reason Germany and Holland are particularly disliked 
by my interlocutors. I will start with the account of three men who 
worked at Olkiluoto 3 and whom I met early in my fieldwork in 2007. 
We talked when they visited the nearby small town of Rauma to go 
shopping. 
Michał, Leszek and Staszek had different amounts of posting 
experience. Michał was on his first contract, while the other two had 
worked on contracts for at least two decades. I asked them how they 
liked being in Finland. They immediately brought up the topic of 
work: 
Leszek: The working conditions are very good. There is no 
such workload as in Poland or in other countries. You can 
work peacefully here. 
Staszek: Yes. I agree. I decided to prolong the contract, above 
all comparing to the conditions and the work culture here. 
They really care about safety rules and personal relations at 
work [pozycie miedzyludzkie].
Michał: Yes. The same with me. I was surprised because I 
had heard a lot of horrible stuff about contract work. 
Leszek: We experienced it personally with Staszek when we 
worked together in Germany or in other countries. 
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Staszek: [There] you could hit the ceiling. Here it’s peaceful 
and stressless. 
Leszek: It’s a jungle there. [Tam jest dzicz.]
Anna (interviewer): And Finland? 
Leszek: A “Promised Land”. [Ziemia obiecana.] 
Initially, I thought the men had exaggerated the positive picture on 
my account—as a representative of a Finnish university, I was often 
thought to have hidden ties to trade unions, which made me a potential 
liability. However, my fieldwork confirmed various aspects of the 
above image. Meeting with Marek, one of my closest interlocutors, 
took it one step further. 
Marek had been posted to Finland for two years when we met in 
2014. Because I was helping him with institutional matters, we talked 
at least once per week. Marek worked at a middle-sized construction 
site, his third site in Finland. Every time we met, he had some 
anecdote to share about his latest workplace. It often conveyed what 
he considered to be Finns’ relaxed approach to work. He mentioned 
frequent coffee breaks taken by Finnish workers even if the job was not 
done yet and the relative freedom of work on the site. When we met 
on the Labour Day long weekend, he told me cheerfully that, yes, they 
had worked on Saturday but did not overwork themselves because 
the Finnish crew was gone, and there was almost nobody to delegate 
more tasks. Although Marek told his stories with a mix of amusement 
and moral superiority (implying that Poles are hardworking, at least 
when they have to be, while Finns are lazy), he concluded that working 
conditions of this sort should exist on all sites. 
Marek’s story helps to elucidate the posted workers’ concept 
of a good workload. Marek worked fewer hours than many posted 
workers do (some work 12 hours a day), but this is not what left him 
with such a positive impression; in fact, he was rather disappointed 
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that there was not more work, since fewer work hours meant less 
money and more idle time. What he enjoyed was the freedom of 
the work, trust and respect: nobody disciplining him at every step 
and mistreating him for his foreign origin. Marek did not see this as 
related to his posting company. It was the Finnish local employer that 
made the difference. He felt, as Leszek and his workmates did, that he 
was treated as a person, not just a commodified labour resource. In 
Germany or Holland, on the other hand, Polish workers seem to face 
much harsher working conditions. “In Germany, [a] Pole is just meant 
to work, work and work. And it is never enough”, I was told by Mirek, 
an industrial painter. When I asked whether he was referring to long 
hours, he stressed, “No, it’s not that. When you are abroad, you want 
to have long working hours because you want to earn more. It’s rather 
about mental pressure [presja psychiczna], mobbing if you wish [taki 
mobbing]”. With the reference to mobbing, Mirek was speaking of 
lack of trust in the workers and exerting discipline through strict 
supervision. He cited his recent posting to Norway as a contrast. 
There, for instance, his principal employer (a Norwegian company) 
expected regular written comments on possible improvements to the 
work. “I didn’t know what to write”, Mirek told me, bemused. 
The above narratives add another layer to Marx’s notion of 
exploitation as unequal exchange of labour. Writing about exploitation 
as degradation, philosopher Ruth Sample (2003, 57) states that 
exploitation involves “interacting with another being for the sake of 
advantage in a way that degrades or fails to respect the inherent value 
in that being”. In these terms, workers seem to suggest that employers 
in Finland and Norway recognise and respect their inherent value 
more than employers in other places. Good money is among the 
manifestations of this respect, rooted in several decades of Nordic 
social-welfare policies and class compromises between employers and 
employees (Korpi 2006). The welfare policies empowered the working 
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class in the Nordic countries, and now—at least partially—they 
empower the posted workers too. 
This is not to say that the workers disregard the larger role of 
principal contractors in the subcontracting system. In the Nordic 
countries, posting itself may be considered as a sign of a declining 
commitment to labour-market agreements of the welfare state 
(Kananen 2014, 163–176; Kettunen 2006). Workers are keenly aware 
that, in Finland and Germany alike, they are posted abroad because 
principal contractors find them easier and less costly to hire and fire 
than local labour, and when their short-term contracts end or when 
they are left hanging until the last moment without any assurance of 
the contract’s extension, it is the principal employer who has the final 
say. “Let’s face it: we are just a cheap labour force for them”, one of the 
workers told me, where “them” implies all the Western production 
and construction companies that use Polish labour. Workers thus can 
be left with a sense of being elevated and denigrated by the principal 
employer at the same time. 
The posting companies: “Because the 
Polish boss has to make money”
Inherent to the transnational subcontracting logic is that even if 
workers’ legal rights are abused, the principal contractor can still be a 
good employer in the workers’ eyes. For instance, the positive image 
enjoyed by Norway and Finland does not mean that transgressions 
do not occur in the Nordic countries. In fact, Olkiluoto itself became 
infamous for non-compliance with Finnish wage standards. From the 
perspective of the workers and the law, though, the subcontractors are 
first in line to be made accountable for any irregularities. In the extract 
at the beginning of this article, Adam dissected his employment 
chain and commented that it is made to favour the “bosses” and not 
him. However, he pointed not to all the bosses in the subcontracting 
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chain but to Polish ones specifically. He characterised their priorities 
sarcastically: “Obviously, it’s the Polish boss who has to make money” 
[Wiadomo, Polski prezes musi zrobic]. He suggested two things 
here: that the company that posts him is directly responsible for his 
situation and that because it is a Polish company, it is likely to exploit 
its employees. He echoed the words of another interlocutor, Jan, 
who on our second meeting acknowledged that his daily allowance 
is less than it should be but “this can be expected from the Polish 
company”. The suspicion of Polish subcontracting companies is 
formed in extension of the bad experiences workers have had with 
Polish companies at home and the bad image Polish companies have 
in the Polish media. 
The suspicion of misconduct is centred on financial arrangements: 
workers assume (in light of various legal cases, rightly so) that even 
if the principal employer provides the subcontracting company 
with sufficient funds for good contracts, there is always room for 
mishandling those funds. Polish companies can gain money at the 
expense of higher salaries, better accommodation or more trips 
home paid for by the employer. Rapidly changing transnational and 
national regulations complicate matters because workers often are 
uncertain about what they are entitled to legally. Informal networks 
often lead them to guesses, but information remains scattered, and 
more formalized steps such as joining a trade union may result in 
the contract being terminated (see also Matyska 2019). At the same 
time, official claims require a basis in the law, and various aspects 
of posted work are a grey area that perhaps will never be regulated, 
no matter how important they are to the workers. These include the 
quality of accommodation and use of a worker-friendly system for 
rotation of work. In the absence of known, uniform, and objective 
rules, workers’ subjective perceptions dictate which expectations are 
‘legitimate’ and hence where the line for employers’ transgression 
lies. Throughout the fieldwork, I have heard numerous complaints 
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and exclamations that point to “good” and “bad” posting companies. 
A “good” employer provides good pay and tools for transnational 
contact, such as frequent visits home, and allows workers to 
renegotiate dissatisfactory conditions. Workers are aware that not 
everything depends solely on the direct employer (for instance, trips 
home may be related to the production rhythm established by the 
principal contractor), but a good employer tries to maximise the 
benefits and reduce the costs (financial, moral and emotional) borne 
by the worker. A good employer also offers a safety net to some extent 
against the flexible employment strategy of the principal employer, 
mitigating the uncertainty of life between contracts. 
Such mitigation can occur in two ways: if the company operates 
as a temporary staffing agency, it can offer the worker a new contract 
(transnational or domestic) almost immediately, or, if the company, 
in addition to transnational subcontracting, carries out business in 
Poland, it can employ the worker on a permanent basis. The latter 
arrangement is discussed the least in the literature because temporary 
staffing agencies dominate the posting business, but many Polish 
companies that act as subcontractors do conduct regular business 
in Poland too. This arrangement can seem the least precarious for 
the worker, who is granted the continuity of employment after the 
contract abroad is over. However, it has its pitfalls since a worker may 
be pressured to go abroad at a specific time, even if not wanting to do 
so, in the knowledge that refusal to go may result in no longer being 
posted abroad. For instance, one of my interlocutors refused only 
once in 10 years to go abroad, when his wife was about to give birth. 
Thus, I would argue, the posted workers’ sense of being exploited 
may cover both being laid off unexpectedly while under a short-
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Concluding remarks: The disappearing act
Transnational processes bring about new labour relations. They make 
the threads of workers’ exploitation and employers’ responsibilities 
more complex and empirically trickier to disentangle. Labour-
capital power relations behind transnational subcontracting can be 
described as a disappearing act: the exploitation is sometimes visible 
to the workers, while at other times it disappears along with its agent. 
Posted workers point to different tangible and non-tangible elements 
of exploitation: wages, accommodation, the length of contracts, trips 
back home and attitude towards the workforce. Responsibilities and 
transgressions of direct employers are the most visible. Principal 
contractors remain in the wings, setting the stage, and their liability is 
not always clear. They may, as my data suggest, appear to the workers 
as more ethical and respectful than the direct employers do. This bears 
traces of the Marxian/Gramscian idea of false consciousness whereby 
workers misidentify the sources of their exploitation. However, 
not all is opaque. My interlocutors are aware that they are posted 
because principal employers consider them a low-cost, dispensable 
alternative to the local workforce, with intermediary companies 
helping to meet demand. Although workers do not always see the 
full employment picture, these workers can put the pieces together 
and are fairly conscious of their position in the global division of 
labour. The question remains to what extent fragmented employment 
relationships pertinent to subcontracting undermine the workers’ 
ability and desire for a collective and organised action which would 
equally challenge both principal and direct employers. 
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“It is also about helping people”
Women attorneys’ commitment to 
public service and incentives for pro 
bono work in Finland and Poland
Marta Choroszewicz
Introduction
Lawyers’ voluntary work, referred to as pro bono work, has recently 
attracted prominent attention among researchers of the American 
legal profession as the result of a growth in the pro bono activities of 
lawyers and law firms (e.g. Cummings & Sandefurt 2013; Dinovitzer 
& Garth 2009; Granfield 2007). The issue of lawyers’ commitment to 
public service through their legal services to the indigent has been 
regarded as lawyers’ professional obligation. This commitment can 
be undertaken through state-sponsored legal aid and free of charge 
through the pro bono work of lawyers. Legal aid refers to a legal 
service that is provided to individuals who cannot afford it and thus 
it is partially or fully covered by a state (Bojarski 2003). By contrast, 
pro bono work is completely free of charge—it is a legal service that 
lawyers undertake individually or within their law firm on behalf 
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of underprivileged clients and/or organisations on a voluntary basis 
(Bojarski 2003, 19). While voluntary work among lawyers has always 
been present, its current popularity is linked to the institutionalisation 
of pro bono activities by law firms (Cummings 2004). 
In this chapter, I am specifically concerned with the issue of pro 
bono work among Finnish and Polish women attorneys. The issue of 
legal service to indigent people or/and organisations is also on the 
rise among lawyers and law firms in Finland and Poland (Latham & 
Watkins 2012, 72–75, 236–240). However, the phenomenon has not 
received enough attention among scholars in these two countries, 
and thus there is little knowledge about the conditions that encourage 
attorneys and other groups of lawyers to engage in services for the 
public good. The findings of this study can foster discussion on 
lawyers’ and law firms’ engagement in the provision of access to 
justice for the disadvantaged in Finland and in Poland.
This chapter rests upon two theoretical perspectives towards pro 
bono work, specifically pro bono as lawyers’ professional ideal and 
obligation as well as a way to strengthen lawyers’ own positions in the 
market for legal services. The first perspective is advocated by lawyers’ 
associations, lawyers themselves and scholars. Researchers link the 
origins of this obligation to lawyers’ merits of professionalism and 
their monopoly over provision of legal services granted to them by the 
state (e.g. Bennett 2001; Sossin 2008). In exchange for their prestigious 
social status and self-regulation, lawyers have been expected to 
contribute to the wellbeing of society though their provision of 
justice for disadvantaged individuals. The second perspective focuses 
on pro bono work as a source of professionally valuable resources, 
such as gaining legal skills and expanding networks, which are 
particularly important to novice and minority lawyers (Cummings 
2004; Dinovitzer & Garth 2009; Granfield 2007). Thus, pro bono 
activities can reflect and reinforce structures of hierarchy in the 
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legal profession because they are more likely to benefit elite lawyers’ 
professional standing (Dinovitzer & Garth 2009). 
The chapter continues with background information on the 
organisation of legal aid in both countries, which provides important 
context for understanding women’s experiences with voluntary 
work. Following this, I present the data and methods. The analysis 
is organised around three main incentives for pro bono work found 
among the interviewees, specifically a fulfilment of a professional 
ideal, an opportunity to do socially meaningful work and as a 
way to accrue professionally critical resources. In the conclusion, 
the implications of the findings and ideas for further research are 
discussed. 
Legal aid in Finland and Poland
Finland and Poland differ in the organisation of legal aid. In Finland, 
legal aid is provided by 27 legal aid offices, which are divided among 
six districts: Turku, Vaasa, Eastern Finland, Helsinki, Kouvola and 
Rovaniemi (Latham & Watkins 2012, 73–74). Lawyers employed by 
these offices are called public legal aid attorneys and they give legal 
aid in all kinds of legal matters, such as in the area of contract law, 
family law, employment law and criminal law. In addition, private 
attorneys provide legal aid only in court cases and are reimbursed 
for their work on an hourly basis by clients or by a state (Latham & 
Watkins 2012, 73–74). Their provision of legal aid requires a contract 
with any of the legal aid offices. 
By contrast, in Poland legal aid is provided by private legal advisors 
and attorneys through the so-called ex officio system (Bojarski 2003, 
38). Ex officio cases can be of a civil, labour, family or criminal 
nature. Attorneys or legal advisors are appointed by a court made up 
of the members of the local Council of the Bar or the Council of Legal 
Advisors; however, only attorneys can provide legal aid in criminal 
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cases. While legal advisors have full legal jurisdiction over civil, labour 
and commercial cases, their representation in ex officio system covers 
only one percent of cases because most ex officio cases are criminal 
cases (Bojarski 2003, 17–19). Thus, attorneys provide most of the legal 
aid in Poland as they are required to take on ex officio criminal cases 
assigned to them by the court (Latham & Watkins 2012, 236–237).
Methodology
This chapter draws on interview data with 25 Finnish and Polish 
women attorneys from law offices located predominantly in Helsinki 
and Warsaw. The data was collected for a doctoral dissertation on 
women attorneys’ careers in Finland and Poland in 2011 (Choroszewicz 
2014). The interviews lasted from 35 minutes to two and a half hours. 
The interviewees practiced in law firms which differed in size and 
legal specialty. The majority of the Polish interviewees practiced law 
as generalists in their own solo practices. The majority of Finnish 
interviewees worked in middle-sized or large law firms as partners 
or senior associates. The Finnish interviewees were more likely to be 
specialised compared to their Polish counterparts. The interviewees 
ranged in age from their early 30s to their 80s. 
The data was analysed drawing on thematic content analysis 
(Silverman 2006) around the following questions: How do the 
interviewees talk about voluntary work? What types of activities 
do they classify as such? Why do they engage in pro bono activity? 
The themes were then identified analysed in the light of theoretical 
perspectives on lawyers’ pro bono work. Finally, the findings were 
compared among interviewees to explore the similarities and 
differences in their engagement in voluntary work. The interviewees’ 
nationality is marked by the first initials, “F” for Finnish and “P” for 
Polish interviewees.
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Empirical findings
Legal aid as a less popular form of 
commitment to public service 
“Basically it [legal aid] is kind of safe income that we are not 
dependent on that what our client pays or not, but the fee is 
a lot less”. [F]
“Every month I get some ex officio cases which are very 
poorly rewarded. We get minimal fees for them […] 
regardless of how much work or how many visits to the 
court they require. If I am not able to be present at court, I 
need to send a replacement, and the costs of an apprentice 
are two or three times higher than the fee of such a case so 
there is no monetary gain in such cases, only expenses. So I 
treat them as my pro bono work”. [P] 
Polish and Finnish interviewees have different experiences with 
legal aid that is assigned to them by a court (Poland) or by a legal 
aid office (Finland). Polish interviewees report receiving ex officio 
cases of different kinds, such as criminal, civil, family or labour, on 
a monthly basis. Although any member of the Bar can be appointed 
in an ex officio case, the criteria of distribution are not clear to the 
Polish interviewees and thus invoke critique as they notice that some 
attorneys are more likely to be appointed legal aid cases than others. 
This feeling of inequality and frustration is shared not only by the 
interviewees but also by larger group of Polish attorneys (Bojarski 
2003, 55). 
In addition, Polish interviewees perceive their obligation to 
provide legal aid as distressful because of the arguably inadequate 
financial compensation of ex officio cases from the Polish state. 
These interviewees also relate their dislike of ex officio cases to the 
low status of clients and rather unwinnable character of their cases. 
Thus, they consider their work on these cases as the fulfilment of their 
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professional commitment to public service. However, if they have the 
opportunity, they delegate ex officio cases to their apprentices who, 
as they argue, can practice their legal skills. By contrast, the Finnish 
interviewees’ accounts demonstrate that the provision of legal aid can 
be beneficial for some law offices in terms of regular and predictable 
income from these cases, even though the fees from legal aid are lower 
than that of legal services charged by private practices in Finland. 
Pro bono as a more popular form of 
commitment to public service 
Pro bono as a professional ideal
“I would even say it is our obligation [to do pro bono work] 
because there are so many bad things happening in this 
world. […] If you have achieved a lot in your life you have a 
good opportunity to give something to others”. [F]
“I learnt it from my older colleague with whom I used 
to work that you need to always have a case you work on 
not for money but in order to help someone. After all, it 
is a profession aimed at helping people even though it is 
nowadays mainly treated in terms of services. Therefore, 
one cannot forget that it is also about helping people”. [P]
Interviewees of both nationalities stress specifically a sense of 
professional duty to serve their communities, which they argue 
that they have learnt from their mentors. This indicates that the 
interviewees have successfully embodied the professional ideal 
of lawyers’ commitment to public service, which legitimises the 
profession itself (Bennett 2001; Dinovitzer & Garth 2009). Pro bono 
work seems to provide the interviewees with a sense of job satisfaction 
(Choroszewicz 2014, 82–85). 
In addition, some interviewees’ accounts demonstrate that larger 
law firms tend to provide an organisational infrastructure for pro 
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bono work by delegating particular employees to do some pro bono on 
behalf of a firm so that other lawyers can focus entirely on generating 
profits. In other firms, employers might encourage all employees to 
do some voluntary work which they can later report in rankings of 
law firms with regard to charity work. The following interviewees’ 
accounts are indicative of this: 
“It is rare that a law firm as a whole is engaged in pro bono 
work because honestly speaking someone needs to earn so 
that someone else can do some pro bono work. Generally it is 
so, at least in our firm, every one of us tries to do something 
pro bono even just for the sake of ordinary human decency. 
In other firms there are employees who are in charge of pro 
bono work, but honestly they are sustained by the rest of 
firm. The rest of firm earns money so that they can work 
pro bono”. [P] 
“The firm has a commitment to do a certain amount of pro-
bono work and we do that. We have been also giving free 
legal advice for the Bar Association for individual persons. 
But that is sort of done within the firms, but it is not like 
you do something individually and not in the name of the 
firm. Typically you do it in the name of the firm, and this is 
of course part of what we do”. [F] 
Pro bono as an opportunity to do socially meaningful work 
“Sometimes—maybe I should not admit it so openly—I 
take some cases for free. Those are people who do not have 
money for legal advice”. [P] 
“Actually I started to do a little of it [pro bono] because 
I think now at this point I can even afford to do it, but I 
think once the kids are few more years older, then it will 
even become easier. […] It makes you feel good, it gives a 
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The accounts of some interviewees of both nationalities also indicate 
that they treat pro bono as a way to balance the pressure that is 
prevalent in their current workplaces to generate profits. One of the 
frustrations of corporate lawyers is linked to the shift in orientation 
of the legal profession from public service towards business service 
(Bennett 2011, 86–92; Wallace & Kay 2008, 1039–1040). This shift 
is more prominent in the case of corporate lawyers who serve 
predominantly corporate clients and thus have fewer opportunities 
to feel that they are making difference to others’ lives. Pro bono work 
appears to provide the interviewees from large law firms with a sense 
of doing socially valuable work, which they do not necessarily have 
when serving corporate clients. Both Finnish and Polish interviewees 
emphasise their satisfaction with the opportunity to help others 
through pro bono activities. However, some interviewees from large 
law firms emphasise that doing pro bono work was impossible early 
in their careers when they needed to juggle a demanding career and 
family life (Choroszewicz 2016). 
Pro bono as a source of professionally critical resources 
“But once at my department, I found some information that 
an association needed volunteers to help accident victims. 
I got there in this way. […] I worked there as a volunteer 
and at some moment we established a civil-law partnership 
outside that association. […] I do not deny that I counted on 
the fact that some of the people I would meet there would 
later come back to me as my clients in this office”. [P]
Three Polish interviewees from small law offices mention that pro 
bono has opened up new career prospects. They started to give free 
legal counselling in law schools with an expectation of acquiring 
practical legal skills and accessing networks of potential clients and 
employers, which later they utilised to advance their careers. This 
finding supports the results of other studies that point to pro bono as 
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a source of professionally important resources, specifically to lawyers 
who are more likely to face limited opportunities for training and 
career development (e.g. Granfield 2007; Mather, McEwen, & Maiman 
2001). The motivation for pro bono activity can be specifically 
prominent in cases of novice lawyers who want to practice their skills 
and thus gain professional recognition among their colleagues and 
potential clients (Dinovitzer & Garth 2009).
Conclusion
The findings demonstrated that the women attorneys show more 
positive attitude towards their commitment to public service when 
they have more control over it. The analysis also indicates that some 
voluntary activities such as individually chosen recipients of pro bono 
are more popular among the interviewees because of differences in 
prestige and job satisfaction they provide for lawyers. The Finnish 
interviewees seem more likely to endorse and engage in pro bono work 
because they are not obliged to give legal aid. They also experience the 
Finnish system of financial compensation for legal aid more positively 
than their Polish counterparts.
Pro bono appears as a more favoured form of lawyers’ commitment 
to public service compared to legal aid. The motivation for pro bono 
among the attorneys of larger law firms includes an opportunity to 
fulfil a professional ideal and to engage in socially meaningful work. 
Lawyers’ commitment to pro bono work is increasingly an issue of 
whole law firms that want to be able to demonstrate their commitment 
to public service in annual rankings of firms (Cummings 2004). 
Employers might also perceive pro bono activity as a part of novice 
lawyers’ training (Cummings 2004). The incentives among the 
attorneys of small law firms for pro bono include, besides the ones 
mentioned above, an accruement of professionally critical resources. 
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The insights into the women attorneys’ incentives for pro bono also 
provide better understanding of the paradox of women lawyers’ high 
career satisfaction despite their disadvantages in career advancement 
in the legal profession in general (e.g. Chiu 1998; Hull 1999) and in 
the studied countries (Choroszewicz 2014). Pro bono allows women 
to fulfil their interest to serve their communities, which seems to 
be positively reflected in their job satisfaction. This finding needs 
further research in order to analyse whether this interest of women 
motivates them to make career choices that carry professional and 
financial sacrifices or whether they are channelled by their employers 
to make these career choices which are often perceived as more 
appropriate for women lawyers due to the work nature and perceived 
work-life balance achieved in pro bono work (Biese & Choroszewicz 
2018; Hearn, Biese-Stjernberg, Choroszewicz, & Husu 2016, 64–65). 
Finally, further studies on pro bono activities also need to examine 
men lawyers’ incentives to do voluntary work in both countries to 
test whether the findings of other studies (Dinovitzer & Garth 2009; 
Granfield 2007) on women lawyers’ greater endorsement and practical 
commitment to pro bono work hold in the European settings.
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The rise of lean organisations 
in Nordic countries
How recent changes in public sector 
management are shaping working life
Armi Mustosmäki, Tomi Oinas & Timo Anttila
Introduction
Organisation of work has long been at the core of sociological 
debates of working life: how working life is changing, why and 
what implications these changes have on the organisation of work, 
employees and society. Work organisation is also a central scene 
where the management and the employees, theories and everyday 
practices confront one another. From a managerial perspective, 
the main interest is in increasing the productivity and efficiency 
of the processes, whereas employees tend to resist the continuous 
intensification and erosion of working conditions. Consequently, 
questions of autonomy and control are inherently intertwined in 
these discussions of the organisation of work.
At the era of industrialisation in the late 1880s and 1890s, 
scientific management—better known as Taylorism—was introduced 
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to analyse manual labour (process) piece by piece and to reorganise to 
maximise productivity. These ideas have been criticised widely during 
more than one hundred years of degradation of work: increasing 
managerial control, routinising and stripping tasks from skills, 
making jobs dull and employees unsatisfied (e.g. Braverman 1974). 
Management theories and various ideas for increasing productivity 
travel across the borders but also across sectors, from manufacturing 
to services and from private to public sector organisations. Taylorism 
was born and considered to belong to factories; however, similar 
elements of formalisation and control of work have been applied to 
white-collar work in offices (Crompton & Jones 1984) and services, 
such as call centres (e.g. Taylor & Bain 1999). 
Similarly, to increase efficiency and productivity, the lean 
production model was born and developed in the Japanese car 
industry and American consultancy, but its main principles have 
recently gained wide interest, including in Nordic countries, for the 
processes of restructuring the public sector organisations such as 
hospitals (Björkman 2013; Laursen, Gertsen, & Johansen 2003). More 
broadly, New Public Management (NPM) is the common heading for 
the public sector managerial reforms aiming at increasing efficiency 
by relying on adopted ideas from the private sector (Emery & Giauqu 
2005). Public organisations are facing increasing demands for constant 
structural rationalisation and result-based resource allocation. New 
demands concerning accountability have turned into increased usage 
of auditing and evaluations (Hall 2013; Movitz & Sandberg 2013). 
These ideas have become widely articulated and disseminated by 
consultants, think tanks and international agencies such as the IMF, 
the World Bank and OECD (see e.g. Hebdon & Kirkpatrick 2005). 
Consequently, the public sector has been in considerable 
turbulence: organisations are being reorganised and restructured, 
functions are outsourced and new technologies and new work 
processes are being introduced. This travelling of managerial ideas 
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shapes and reshapes working life as ideas born in different contexts 
are imported and implemented to national platforms and specific 
sectors and organisations. The suitability of imported managerial 
models in different contexts, especially success of NPM inspired 
organisational reforms from employee point of view has been 
questioned in various studies (e.g. Björkman 2013; Hvidman & 
Calmar Andersen 2013). In Scandinavian countries, research around 
lean production models has remained active (Sederblad 2013), yet in 
Finland, NPM and especially invasion of lean production models into 
managerial and organisational reforms have attained surprisingly 
little academic attention (also Heikkilä & Martinsuo 2015). Especially 
the consequences of these reforms for employee relations and 
organisation of work have remained largely untouched in academic 
debates in Finland. Subsequently, in this chapter we discuss, in the 
light of recent studies, how the organisation of work has changed 
and what possible implications these changes have for employees. 
The chapter is based on the research made in the Work Environment 
funded project “Organisation of work, co-determination and 
employee wellbeing in Finland and in Europe” led by Timo Anttila at 
the University of Jyväskylä from 2013–2015. 
Management and change in organisation 
of work in Nordic countries 
Workplaces in the Nordic countries, including Finland, have been 
most active in organisational restructuring compared to other 
European countries: over 70% of Nordic workers report restructuring 
impacted their immediate working environment during the three 
preceding years. Health and public administration have been 
among the sectors where the largest proportion of workers report 
having been exposed to organisational change (Eurofound 2012, 
31). The public sector has been in turbulence and the target of large 
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restructuring pressures due to the drive to curtail expenditure on 
public services. Reasons for public sector restructuration lie in the 
changes in the demographic structure and worries concerning the 
sustainability of the cost structure of the welfare states. Critical 
tones have emphasised, that public organisations are inefficient, and 
the public sector employment model was characterised as inflexible 
and hierarchical, producing a poorly motivated and overprotected 
workforce (Hebdon & Kirkpatrick 2005). 
Radnor and Osborne (2013) state that “lean thinking” has 
especially become a recent prominent and popular approach to public 
service reform. New public management has made an entry also to 
the Nordic public sector, leading to restructuration of organisations 
and work practices and a strongly present tradition of lean thinking. 
Sederblad and colleagues (2013) identified a “second wave” of lean 
management in Nordic countries, also visible in the public sector. The 
core idea of the lean concept is effective resource management that 
will be achieved with a flow-based production layout, reducing waste 
and increasing standardisation.
In the situation of constrained public spending, lean thinking 
has been promoted as enabling to maintain service quality and at 
the same time even to increase service productivity and to improve 
resource utilisation. Lean thinking in public sector may be seen to 
include various related management models, such as management by 
performance and objectives, total quality management and business 
process reengineering (e.g. Hall 2013; Hvidman & Calmar Andersen 
2013). 
At the work-place level, these management and production models 
increase the need for organisational capabilities for standardising, 
documenting, reporting and assessing the quality of their functions 
(see e.g. Meagher & Szebehely 2013). For the organisation of work 
and workers, this means increased accountability and control of 
work processes, using of working time and compliance to various 
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standardised processes. These processes naturally restrict autonomy 
of the employee. Certain level of freedom is seen to be required in 
order to create innovations and reversely, hurriedness, standards 
and predefined procedures might limit the time and space to create 
innovations.
If restructuration of the public sector has been politically 
promoted and publicly accepted in order to sustain—and renew—the 
Nordic welfare state, another dogma for success and competitiveness 
of the national economy is innovation. Innovation is seen as a central 
requirement for the success and competitiveness of a business 
(Kantola 2006), but also that of national economy. Fostering of 
national performance has been a national interest in Finland on 
many occasions through the 1900s, and work and production have 
from time to time been connected to political issues (Kettunen 2001). 
In recent years, innovation-focused approaches to management 
have been recognised and promoted greatly in Finland, both 
nationally and at the organisation level. Centrality of innovations 
has been promoted to the extent that it is seen as a new paradigm 
in management theories (Seeck & Kuokkanen 2010; Seeck & Laakso 
2010). The core aim of the innovation paradigm is to increase the 
productivity of workers by getting them to constantly improve 
products and processes, and to develop new ones in order to improve 
the competitiveness of organisations; in this respect it does not fall 
far from principles of lean management, which also rely on constant 
improvement.
Innovation and new forms of work organisation are closely 
linked: they are seen as a key for employee wellbeing and competitive 
performance. Adoption of new forms of work organisation have 
also been on the European political agenda since the Luxembourg 
Employment Summit and the launch of the European Commission 
Green paper on new forms of work organisation (CEC 1997).
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Within innovation research, autonomy has probably received the 
most attention as a feature of the working environment that enables 
creativity and innovation (Gilson & Shalley 2004; Shalley, Gilson, & 
Blum 2000). Capabilities for innovation have been best developed in 
work organisations characterised as “learning organisations”. At the 
workplace level, it refers to an organisational culture where employees 
are encouraged to learn, take initiative to improve processes and 
services and solve problems independently. Autonomy encompasses 
personal control over how time is allocated and determination of how 
the work is carried out. Learning organisation is seen to represent “the 
opposite” of Tayloristic organisation of work, which is characterised 
by separating the planning of the work process from the execution 
of the task. Tayloristic work organisation may be described in terms 
of low autonomy, direct control by the boss, a work pace externally 
determined by the boss, customers, colleagues or production line 
and low possibilities for learning at work. In the next section, we 
discuss some recent results concerning the changing organisation of 
work in Nordic countries. The chapter is concluded with discussion 
concerning the possible implications of observed changes. 
Changing organisation of work in Nordic public 
and private sector organisations 2000–2010
In our study (Anttila, Oinas, & Mustosmäki 2018) we have applied a 
two-phase methodology1 developed by Lorenz & Valeyre (2005) for 
1 First, multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is used to identify the 
underlying associations that exist among the individual variables measuring 
work organisation and to synthesise the responses to several categorical 
questions which have a common theme. Second, the results of MCA are used 
as a basis for clustering individuals into distinct types of work organisation 
using hierarchical cluster analysis. After deriving results from MCA and 
hierarchical cluster analysis, we use crosstabs to examine differences between 
sectors and countries with regard to the prevalence of different forms of work 
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deriving different types of work organisation. We have analysed the 
change in organisation of work in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
both in public and private sector organisations covering the years 
2000, 2005 and 2010. The analyses are based on the European 
Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) collected by The European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
(Eurofound 2012). EWCS is an employee-level survey, thus the forms 
of work organisation are based on individual reports. We adopted 
this methodology to compress information and build “ideal types” of 
work organisation from large data and to see how different types of 
work organisation have increased or declined. Based on 15 categorical 
variables, four “ideal typical” forms of work organisation are derived: 
learning, lean, simple and Tayloristic. 
High levels of autonomy, significant task complexity, learning, 
and independent problem solving at work characterise the learning 
organisation type. Lean type of work organisations also entails similar 
characters of decision latitude and task complexity, yet various types 
of controls and norms are more prevalent. Lean organisations have 
autonomous teams, but employees also have more responsibility 
over quality control and working up to quality norms. In addition, 
lean type of work organisation involves more horizontal controls 
(work pace determined by colleagues). Norm-based constraints 
(numerical production targets or performance targets) characterise 
both the Japanese as well as Tayloristic forms of work organisation. 
Measures of hierarchical (direct control by the boss) and automatic 
(automatic speed of machine or movement of product) work pace 
constraints are characteristic of Taylorist work settings. Measures 
organisation. We use regression analysis on the dimensions derived from MCA 
to analyse which factors might explain country and sector differences in work 
organisation. Interaction effects between country and sector with survey year 
are tested to gain insight into whether the general trend in the prevalence of 
different forms of work organisation varies between countries and sectors. For 
more details, see Anttila et al. 2019.
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of task repetitiveness and task monotony capture typical features of 
Taylorism. Simple type of work organisation involves low autonomy, 
task complexity and learning possibilities and less external controls 
compared to lean and Tayloristic types (see also Arundel, Lorenz, 
Lundvall, & Valeyre 2007; Holm, Lorenz, Lundvall, & Valeyre 2010; 
Valeyre et al. 2009). Somewhat similar typologies on job types 
(Holman 2013; Vidal 2013) have also been applied in other studies. 
We were especially interested in analysing how the organisation of 
work changes: Does the actual change correspond to the assumption 
that could be made based on the recent political and business trends? Do 
we find a) convergence between private and public sector organisation 
which could be expected due to the “management fashions”, such 
as second wave of lean which have inspired organisational change 
processes in the public sector? Consequently, the organisation of 
work in the public sector would increasingly resemble to that of the 
private sector. Or do we find b) an increase in learning organisations? 
This could be expected as a result of both popularity of innovation 
management as well as political endeavours to promote the success of 
businesses and economic growth through learning organisations and 
their ability to create innovations.
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Table 1. Prevalence of types of work organisation (%) by country and sector 2000–2010
Type of work 
organisation Year
Denmark Finland Sweden
Private Public Private Public Private Public
Lean organisations
2000 23.8 25.2 23.2 24.5 21.1 24.2
2005 32.8 36.4 27.6 36.7 26.2 34.2
2010 30.0 39.8 26.6 35.8 32.0 29.5
Simple traditional work 
organisations
2000 19.9 15.7 19.3 22.2 23.8 19.9
2005 17.8 9.1 21.0 13.6 16.3 11.4
2010 19.9 7.1 17.1 14.8 14.1 14.9
Learning organisations
2000 33.3 44.9 18.0 25.2 28.1 39.4
2005 27.1 39.2 16.6 27.3 36.1 44.3
2010 31.4 42.1 20.4 27.8 29.9 38.0
Tayloristic organisations
2000 22.9 14.2 39.5 28.2 27.0 16.6
2005 22.2 15.4 34.9 22.4 21.3 10.1
2010 18.7 11.0 35.9 21.6 24.1 17.5
Interestingly, our findings do not exactly correspond to either one of 
these assumptions. It is evident that the general trend in all Nordic 
countries has been the increase in work formalisation, in other words, 
the lean type organisation of work. Put another way, work processes 
where employees are involved include more standardisation, 
production and performance targets than 10 years earlier, they have 
to look up for quality norms, and colleagues determine work pace. 
However, this process has not resulted in convergence between public 
and private sector work organisation, although the direction of 
change has been similar moving towards the lean type in each Nordic 
country, both in public and private sector organisations. 
When comparing public and private sectors, lean type is more 
prevalent in the public sector even after controlling for sectoral 
differences in structural factors. This finding indicates that lean has 
been adopted widely into public sector organisations and is currently 
at a higher level than it is in the private sector. In addition, lean type 
of work organisation was more prevalent in larger establishments. 
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Contrary to the expectations that only lower level occupations and 
jobs could be subjected to controls and standardisation, our results 
show how work formalisation (lean type) became more prevalent in 
upper occupational groups; in other words, knowledge work has not 
been insulated from these trends. 
When comparing countries, it was revealed how lean types of 
work organisation were at the same level in all three Nordic countries 
in 2000, but in 2010, the lean was most popular in the Finnish and 
Danish public sector. Learning forms are clearly more common 
and Taylorist forms are less common in Sweden and Denmark in 
both sectors when compared to Finland. These differences are quite 
notable and large, especially with regard to the private sector. This 
indicates how the cultures and ways of organising work are quite 
different in Finland. The new forms of work organisation associated 
with productivity and innovation are not as common as in other 
Nordic countries.
Implications for the wellbeing of employees, 
working life and policy making
Implications of various management fashions and different ways 
of organising work may be studied from various perspectives: 
interest could be placed for instance on organisational matters such 
as operations and processes, innovative capabilities or employee 
wellbeing. Previous literature reviews and studies show that lean 
inspired management and organisation of work have been associated 
with both negative and positive consequences for employee well-being. 
Lean has been associated with intensification of work, standardisation 
and, consequently, with decreased health and well-being. On the 
other hand, there is also evidence of positive outcomes, such as 
improved processes and job contents and increased opportunities for 
participation and learning (see e.g. Hasle, Bojesen, Langaa Jensen, 
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& Bramming 2012; Landsbergis, Cahill, & Schnall 1999; Seppälä & 
Klemola 2004).
More precisely, it has been concluded that different elements of lean 
production models have different consequences on employee well-
being (see e.g. Schouteten & Benders 2004; Toivanen & Landsbergis 
2013). The consequences are also related to what kind of job these 
principles are applied. For instance, there has been discussion on 
whether principles of lean, especially the control and measurement 
models, are suitable for all kinds of work, especially in public sector 
work; studies have found that in more easily standardised processes, 
such as laboratories and routine operations in a hospital, employees 
benefit from lean management by improved work practices and work 
processes. However, employees with complex tasks and processes, such 
as social workers or nurses in care work, perceive lean as controlling 
their autonomy, increasing hurriedness, disturbing the possibilities 
for good care, or even posing problems to work according to ethical 
standards (e.g. Hasle 2010; Nielsen & Edwards 2010; on NPM lead 
reforms see also Hirvonen 2014; Mänttäri-Van der Kuip 2015). 
Implications of increasing lean inspired organisation of work 
for innovation are also somewhat unclear and dependent on the 
implementation. Research literature differentiates between enabling 
and coercive bureaucracies which either support or restrict innovation 
(see e.g. Lovén 2013). Coercive organisations restrict innovative 
capabilities by concentrating on rules, standards, productivity and 
continuous improvement, and consequently, time and space for 
creativity might be wiped out of the organisation. On the other hand, 
by reducing waste and improving processes, lean ideology might also 
lead to more innovation through saving time and space for creativity 
and innovation. In the study of Arundel et al. (2007), the lean type 
of organisation of work was associated with innovation strategies 
related to modifying and adopting from others, whereas learning 
forms were coupled with radical and creative in-house innovation. 
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This gives reason to presume that although lean involves learning and 
problem solving, opportunities for innovation might be limited by 
higher prevalence of constraints and limited autonomy. 
Do these results on the increasing formalisation of work have 
implications for national policy making in Finland? Our results 
underline how Tayloristic forms of work organisation are clearly 
more common in Finland compared to Sweden and Denmark, and 
the differences were not due to structural factors (such as differences 
in shares of industry and services). Thus, there is demand for 
organisational development and policy support for further work 
life development, especially in Finland. However, recent political 
efforts to create a “productivity leap” have concentrated on rather 
old-fashioned resolutions, such as increasing working time without 
increases in wages. Less emphasis is put on developing the (quality 
of) working life or seeking increases in productivity from new forms 
of work organisation. In addition, unions and labour legislation 
are accused of becoming barriers to innovation and productivity, 
even if vast research evidence emphasises the success of the Nordic 
model from various perspectives (e.g. Ulkoasiainministeriö 2006). 
There is research evidence on how unions in Nordic countries have 
not rejected new management ideas, such as lean management. On 
the contrary, employee organisations have played an active role in 
diffusing and shaping a Nordic version of lean management. The 
Nordic employment model has especially been successful in yielding 
job quality and employee well-being (e.g. Gallie 2013; Oinas, Anttila, 
Mustosmäki, & Nätti 2012), partly explained by strength of the 
unions and labour legislation (e.g. Esser & Olsen 2012). Research 
has informed our knowledge on the relationships between new 
forms of work organisation, autonomy, innovation and productivity 
although—at least on a rhetorical level—there is a growing need for 
policy-making. 
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Globalisation1 is commonly considered to have major effects on 
labour market performance and outcomes in advanced industrial 
societies. The internationalisation of markets for goods and 
capital has brought about increased competition between firms 
on a global scale. The need for creating competitive advantage has 
pressured countries into creating business and investment-friendly 
environments. Deregulation and privatisation of labour, capital and 
goods markets are aimed at improving competitiveness and efficiency 
of the economy, but at the same time increase the vulnerability of 
1 In this chapter, when referring to “globalisation” what is meant is economic 
globalisation, i.e. the opening up of markets for goods and capital. Obviously, 
there are other forms of globalisation, such as social, cultural and technological, 
but these are not studied here. 
142
Aart-Jan Riekhoff
Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds)
labour markets to economic shocks and increase the exposure of 
workers to labour market risks (Buchholz et al. 2009; Genschel 2004).
In the literature on globalisation and the welfare state, there are 
two main hypotheses on how governments react to these challenges 
of globalisation (Koster 2009; Meinhard & Potrafke 2012). The 
“globalist” or “efficiency” thesis, on the one hand, claims that under 
increasing international openness, the welfare state will contract 
because of pressures to reduce taxes in the world-wide competition 
to attract investors. With capital being more mobile, firms tend to 
reallocate away from regulated and unionised sectors (Potrafke 
2013). The “compensation” hypothesis, on the other hand, states 
that globalisation and economic openness are generally expected to 
enhance feelings of economic insecurity among the population and 
will lead to increased demands for redistribution and protection 
(Agell 2002; Rodrik 1998). Empirical evidence has been provided 
for both hypotheses with no definite conclusion in favour of either 
(Koster 2009). In fact, Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) have interpreted 
this as a possibility that both effects co-exist: governments both 
compensate globalisation losers as well as try to improve efficiency. 
Given the data and methods used so far, most studies have only 
addressed the question of which effect offsets the other, rather than 
which hypothesis is true (Meinhard & Potrafke 2012, 273).
Quantitative comparative studies on the nexus of globalisation 
and labour market protection have used either (changes in) spending 
on unemployment benefits (UB) or UB replacement rates in year 
t as dependent variables (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Gaston & Nelson 
2004; Jensen, Knill, Schulze, & Tosun 2014; Potrafke 2010; Swank 
2005). Analyses of absolute levels of these indicators are, however, 
problematic given the path-dependency of government programmes: 
the absolute level of UB in t is highly correlated to its level in t-1 (Kittel 
& Winner 2005, 280). Changes in expenditures and replacement 
rates are not necessarily policy reforms in themselves, but rather the 
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results of reforms. There might also be a time lag effect: a reform and 
a change in outcomes do not always follow each other in the same 
year (Green-Pedersen 2007). The net outcome of a reform can be 
that expenditures and replacement rates remain unchanged within a 
certain year, whereas actually major shifts in entitlements, eligibility, 
or accessibility do take place, but perhaps over a longer period. 
An additional shortcoming in the empirical literature on 
globalisation and labour market policies is that most studies focus on 
changes in UB as the only indicator of social protection, ignoring that 
fact that other policies and institutions can perform as “functional 
equivalents” (Boeri, Conde-Ruiz, & Galasso 2003; Bonoli 2003). The 
effects of globalisation on employment protection legislation (EPL) 
have been especially under-researched (for exceptions, see: Fischer & 
Somogyi 2009; Potrafke 2010; 2013). EPL, however, performs a very 
different role in the labour market than UB. First, it is commonly 
viewed as more distorting and less efficient as a protection mechanism 
than UB (Blanchard, Jaumotte, & Loungani 2013; OECD 2013; 
Saint-Paul 2002). Second, in terms of labour market protection, EPL 
provides some degree of job security to workers, whereas UB provides 
a certain level of income security. Third, while the terms “institution” 
and “policy” are used interchangeably in this article, EPL resembles 
the concept of an “institution” more closely. Elmelund-Præstekær 
and Baggesen Klitgaard (2012) argued that policy retrenchment (i.e. 
cutting back on expenditure or benefit levels) follows a different logic 
than institutional retrenchment (i.e. changing programmatic rules 
and procedures). Taking these differences into account, there exists the 
additional possibility that one policy is used to offset or compensate 
the negative outcomes of the other in the face of globalisation (Jensen, 
Knill, Schulze, & Tosun 2014).
In order to address some of these above-mentioned shortcomings 
in the literature and to re-test both hypotheses on the basis of new 
data, in this article I identify how globalisation affects the likelihood 
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for different types of labour market reforms. To do so, I make use of a 
new dataset based on the Social Reforms Database that was collected 
by the Fondazione Rodolfo DeBenedetti and the Institute for the Study 
of Labor (fRDB-IZA 2010). On the basis of this data, it is possible 
to take into account expansion and retrenchment of unemployment 
benefits as well as the regulation and deregulation of employment 
protection for a set of 14 European countries for the period of 1980–
2007. This data allows focusing on the reforms as discrete policy 
events, analysing the effects of globalisation on each type of reform, 
as well as controlling for the economic, political and institutional 
settings at each point in time. 
Data
Dependent variables
This chapter makes several innovations in relation to the existing 
literature. First, it treats reforms as discrete policy events and not as 
changes in policy outcomes, such as expenditures and replacement 
rates. Second, it analyses reforms in both UB and EPL with the 
assumption that not all labour market policies are affected similarly 
by globalisation. Third, it treats expansionary and regulatory reforms 
as separate from retrenching and deregulatory reforms in order to 
identify any offsetting effects. 
For operationalising the dependent variables that suit the aims of 
this study, I made use of the fRDB-IZA Social Reforms Database (2010) 
to identify the variation in reforms in UB and EPL for 14 European 
countries over the period of 1980–2007. This database records and 
describes adjustments and reforms that have been implemented 
in UB systems and EPL for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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Using the descriptions and classifications in the dataset, I recoded 
each of the reforms in order to make quantitative analysis possible. 
For details on how the recoding was done, I refer to my previous work 
(Riekhoff 2015; 2017). The result is a series of indicators with different 
levels of comprehensiveness of the reforms. Distinguishing levels of 
comprehensiveness is important because small and corrective policy 
changes occur on a continuous basis, but in this study, the aim is 
to explain the implementation of labour market reforms that are 
intended to have a significant impact. Since this is a new dataset and 
there is no established or tested cut-off point for what makes a reform 
comprehensive, I create a set of dependent variables with various 
comprehensiveness levels for analysis.
UB expansion and EPL regulation are considered as reforms in one 
direction (increased compensation, decreased economic efficiency), 
whereas UB retrenchment and EPL deregulation deviate in the 
opposite direction (decreased compensation, increased efficiency). 
The dependent variables are dichotomous categorical variables, 
expressing whether, in a specific year and in a specific country, a 
reform took place and whether this reform classifies as 1) any reform, 
2) a reform having at least one comprehensive feature, 3) having at least 
two comprehensive features, 4) having at least three comprehensive 
features or 5) having all comprehensive features. If in the same year 
more than one reform takes place, the more comprehensive reform is 
taken into account for analysis.
Independent variables
For the selection of the independent variables for the model, I largely 
followed Allan and Scruggs’s regression specification from their 
2004 study. Their article is commonly used as a benchmark of robust 
findings, which have been reproduced by others in related studies 
(Jensen et al. 2014, 537). Apart from two variables measuring the 
exposure to globalisation (trade and financial openness), economic 
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control variables include GDP growth rate, the government 
balance and the unemployment rate. Political and institutional 
control variables include a corporatism indicator (level of collective 
bargaining, “veto points” (the extent to which a government might 
face institutional obstacles in decision-making) and the percentage 
of left-wing cabinet seats in a given year. Table 1 describes the 
independent and control variables (see also Riekhoff 2015; 2017). 
Table 1. Summary statistics independent variables
Indicator Source Mean SD Min. Max.
Trade openness OECD: Trade-to-GDP-ratio 74.05 32.51 31 184
Financial openness Quinn & Inclan (1997): Capital openness indicator 86.58 16.08 38 100
Unemployment rate OECD: Annual unemployment rates 8.42 4.03 1.62 24.17
Change in 
unemployment rate
OECD: Change in unemployment rates 
(Ut-Ut-1) 0.03 1.13 -3.32 5.06
Government balance
IMF, World Economic Outlook 
Database: General government 
balance as % of GDP
-3.15 3.84 -15.70 6.90
GDP growth rate OECD: Annual GDP growth rate 2.58 2.03 -6.00 10.92
Corporatism Visser (2011): Level of wage coordination 3.42 1.11 1.00 5.00
Left cabinet portfolios Armingeon et al. (2014): Percentage of left-wing cabinet seats 41.07 38.64 0 100
Veto points Armingeon et al. (2014): Veto points composite indicator 1.23 1.26 0 4
UB replacement rates
Van Vliet & Caminada (2012): UB 
net replacement rates for average 
production worker
56.48 19.99 2 92
Methods
The likelihood of each type of reform taking place in each particular 
year was analysed using times-series-cross-section analysis for 
binary data with discrete-time logit models (Allison 1982; Beck, Katz, 
& Tucker 1998). Because there are recurrent events, for example, each 
country can have more than one reform during the period of 1980–
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2007, it is likely that the occurrence of one event is dependent on 
the event history of a particular country. The likelihood of a reform 
taking place is assumed to depend on the duration of the period of 
non-reform. In other words, the observations are temporally related. 
Therefore, to prevent artificially inflated t-values, I followed Beck, 
Katz and Tucker’s (1998) strategy of treating the data as grouped 
duration data and including a series of dummy variables for each of 
the number of years since 1980 or since the last reform occurred. In 
total, 15 dummies were included, taking into account the duration 
effects of 15 years since the start or last event. All economic 
independent variables (trade and financial openness, unemployment, 
government balance and economic growth) have been lagged with 
one year. Country dummies were added to all models to account for 
unobserved country heterogeneity. 
Logit-regression analysis was applied separately for each of 
the reform types at varying levels of comprehensiveness, starting 
with the least comprehensive reform (1) and continuing to the 
most comprehensive type (5). This was done in order to test for the 
sensitivity of the models to the coding of reforms and cut-off points. 
Because the number of events of reform comprehensiveness 4 and 5 
were so rare, these were excluded from the reporting of the findings. 
The likelihood of each reform type at the different comprehensiveness 
levels was analysed in two steps. In the first models (a), only the 
globalisation variables (+ time and country dummies) were entered 
to analyse the direct effects of trade and financial openness. In the 
second models (b), the economic, political and institutional control 
variables were entered. 
Findings
Tables 2–5 show the results of the logit-regression analyses. Overall, 
models performed rather well, with Pearson’s Chi-squared (not 
148
Aart-Jan Riekhoff
Nicol Foulkes Savinetti & Aart-Jan Riekhoff (eds)
reported) being significant at the p<0.05 level for most models apart 
from models for regulation 2a and 3a and deregulation 1a and 2a 
(significant only at a p<0.1 level), whereas deregulation model 2b was 
not significant even at a p<0.1 level. Hence, the models explaining 
reforms in EPL generally performed worse than those for UB reforms.
Trade openness was found to have a significant negative effect on 
the likelihood of reforms aimed at UB expansion, while no effects 
of financial openness were found (Table 2). This suggests that UB 
expansion was more likely to take place when the economy was more 
closed to trade. This effect is consistently significant throughout all 
models. These findings are not so much in support of the efficiency 
hypothesis, but rather a rejection of the compensation hypothesis: 
when more exposed to foreign trade, there is less room for expanding 
labour market protection in the form of UB (although not necessarily 
leading to retrenchment). Moreover, UB expansion was found to be 
more likely to occur in times of fiscal surpluses (expansion models 
1b and 2b); also, the significance of this effect does not hold for the 
more comprehensive type of reform (3b). Hence, with more resources 
in their budgets, governments have more possibilities to increase 
spending on UB. 
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Note: Indicated are coefficients (standard errors). 15 temporal dummies and 14 country dummies not 
reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Table 3 shows that financial openness has consistently significant 
positive effects on the likelihood of UB retrenchment. It means that 
when capital markets are more deregulated, governments are more 
likely to retrench. This is in support of the efficiency hypothesis. 
Trade openness was not found to have any significant effects on UB 
retrenchment. Higher unemployment rates did increase the likelihood 
of UB retrenchment. Hence, in times of growing unemployment, 
governments will more often cut down on UB. The fiscal situation 
does not directly play a role here, unlike in the case of UB expansion. 
Moreover, a significant effect was found for the share of left cabinet seats 
in the case of the least comprehensive UB retrenchment reform type 
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(1b), suggesting that left-wing governments did compensate more in 
terms of unemployment protection. This effect disappeared, however, 
in the models for more comprehensive reforms. The corporatism 
indicator had a negative effect on the likelihood of retrenchment in 
the case of the more comprehensive reform type (3b). This indicates 
that when collective bargaining structures are more centralised, more 
comprehensive UB retrenchments are less common.
















































































































Note: Indicated are coefficients (standard errors). 15 temporal dummies and 14 country dummies not 
reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Globalisation was not found to have any effects on the enhancement 
of EPL (Table 4). The relations with trade openness and financial 
openness were positive in all models but failed to reach any level 
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of significance. Hence, there is no evidence for compensation for 
globalisation through regulatory reforms. The only significant effect 
was found for the share of left cabinet seats in the government, which 
was relatively consistent throughout all three models. Left-wing 
governments are more likely to enhance EPL, hence some mechanism 
of compensation might be at work here.

















































































































Note: Indicated are coefficients (standard errors). 15 temporal dummies and 14 country dummies not 
reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Increased financial openness was found to have a positive significant 
effect on the likelihood of EPL deregulation (Table 5: models 1a, 2a and 
2b). This is in support of the efficiency hypothesis: greater openness to 
international capital forces governments to deregulate labour markets 
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in order to attract investors. No effects of the openness to trade were 
found. Other indirect economic, political and institutional variables 
also did not show any significant effects, apart from a positive effect of 
unemployment rates on the least comprehensive deregulatory reform 
(1b). This means there is some evidence that governments are more 
likely to deregulate in times of higher unemployment. 
















































































































Note: Indicated are coefficients (standard errors). 15 temporal dummies and 14 country dummies not 
reported. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Conclusions
By looking at the effects of globalisation on the likelihood of specific 
labour market reforms taking place, this article has cast some new 
light on the compensation and efficiency hypotheses of globalisation. 
The findings partly supported the efficiency hypothesis: greater 
openness to international capital has led governments to retrench 
and deregulate more. Greater openness to trade has reduced the 
likelihood for UB to be expanded. There is no direct evidence for a 
“race to the bottom”, but greater exposure to globalisation does seem 
to lead to a deterioration of labour market protection. The particular 
effect of financial openness might be on the one hand explained by 
the influence of international capital over national governments. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the financial openness 
indicator measures the degree to which capital flows are regulated 
(Quinn & Inclán 1997). It might be that deregulation of capital and 
labour markets are both the result of a third factor, such as the 
political party in power or the “variety of capitalism” in a certain 
country. The latter would be in line with Swank’s (2002) findings that 
the effects of globalisation depend on national institutional features, 
where decentralised “liberal” economies have chosen a pathway 
of deregulation and retrenchment, whereas more “coordinated” 
economies are more likely to keep existing market regulations and 
welfare structures intact. 
In addition, this study confirmed the importance of domestic 
economic, political and institutional factors, serving either as links 
between globalisation and reforms or as independent determinants. 
Conform with earlier studies, high unemployment rates increase the 
need for UB retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Gaston & Rajaguru 
2008; Hicks & Zorn 2005; Saint-Paul 1996). Budget deficits did not 
necessarily trigger retrenchments (Hicks & Zorn 2005; Gaston & 
Nelson 2004) but did put a brake on further UB expansions. There 
was also some evidence that left-wing parties will reinforce job 
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security for their key constituencies (Emmenegger 2009) and in some 
cases will halt UB retrenchment (Allan & Scruggs 2004; Jensen et al. 
2014; Swank 2005). More centralised collective bargaining was found 
to be an institutional obstacle to the most comprehensive type of UB 
retrenchment only.
As with other studies using panel data methods in comparative 
political economy, results are still sensitive to the definition of the 
dependent variables and the selection of methods and data (see for 
example Kittel & Winner 2005; Wenzelburger, Zohlnhöfer, & Wolf 
2013). This study aimed to address the “dependent variable problem” 
by analysing reforms as discrete policy events and applying discrete-
time logit models. As a first attempt to use this new dataset, these 
innovations are obviously not free from concerns about validity 
and reliability, especially regarding the coding of the reforms and 
choices of cut-off points. To address such concerns, the sensitivity 
of the models to dependent variables with various cut-off points was 
explored. In spite of all caution, the models still yielded some robust 
results.
This study differed from previous studies in the way the dependent 
variables and methods were selected. First, treating reforms as 
discrete policy events enabled establishing a more direct link between 
globalisation and the moment of the implementation of the reform. 
Using this method, the models performed well in explaining UB 
reforms, but less so in explaining reforms of EPL. It is not unlikely 
that it takes a longer time for an economic shock to be felt before 
governments decide to reform legislation, whereas the need to cut 
spending on benefits is often a more urgent and automatic policy 
response. Second, by distinguishing between reforms in UB and 
EPL, it was possible to scrutinise a “variety of reforms” in the face 
of globalisation and other economic shocks, taking place against a 
background of varying political and institutional settings. Third, this 
article shows that there is no single labour market policy response 
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to globalisation. In a complex globalised economy and political 
environment, governments can both compensate as well as enhance 
efficiency in the labour market, even simultaneously. 
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Decentralisation in the context 
of competitiveness discourse
The Finnish labour market 
relations system since 2008
Paul Jonker-Hoffrén
Introduction
Finland saw quite dramatic changes to its system of labour market 
relations between 2008 and 2018. In 2007, the main employers’ 
federation Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto (EK, Confederation of 
Finnish Industries) announced that it would not conclude centralised 
incomes policies anymore, which was the official position in 2008 
(Esmerk 2008). These tulopoliittinen kokonaisratkaisu, or tupo in 
brief, used to be the cornerstone of Finnish labour market policy since 
1968. In that year, the so-called Liinamaa I -agreement was concluded, 
which is seen as the start of the “tupo-era”. In that agreement, 
the labour market partners and the Finnish state agreed that the 
employer would collect union dues directly from employees’ salaries 
and that these dues would be tax-deductable. The partners to these 
agreements are the labour union federations, employers’ federations 
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and the state. A centralised incomes policy usually consisted of 
general wage increases, labour market policy issues as well as tax 
policy changes. According to Kauppinen (2005), all labour market 
partners had their own reasons to negotiate a centralised incomes 
policy, especially since the 1990s: the employers’ federations favoured 
centralised agreements because it would allow the flexibilisation 
of the labour markets, prepare the entrance to EMU and make the 
Finnish economy competitive through wage moderation. The state 
favoured this model as a way to control inflation. Finally, the labour 
movement favoured the centralised model to “manage” the economy 
and, in particular, employment (Kauppinen 2005).
Since 1968, there have been quite a few years without centralised 
incomes policies. In those years, it was not politically feasible to 
reach such an agreement because either the employers or the labour 
unions preferred negotiation at the sectoral level. Nonetheless, the 
announcement in 2008 by EK did come as a shock, although its 
stance was not by itself new (see Bergholm & Bieler 2013). Earlier, 
the President of the Bank of Finland, in 2002, questioned whether 
the solidaristic wage policy hinders the creation of jobs in sectors 
with weaker productivity growth. Furthermore, he questioned 
whether the centralised incomes agreements hindered the allocation 
of resources to those sectors where productivity growth is stronger 
(Taloussanomat 2002). These considerations were based on the 
instrument of the “wage norm”: a way to calculate the potential for 
wage increases based on average productivity growth (Sauramo 
2004). 
The entrance of Finland into the Euro might also have been a catalyst 
towards a reappraisal of the institute of centralised incomes polices 
because Finland’s preferred competitiveness-boosting mechanism 
(devaluation) was not available anymore. Furthermore, the focus 
on the Maastricht criteria regarding public debt and budget deficits 
connected economic growth and public sector wage growth through 
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regulation. The public sector, like in many European countries, 
is female-dominated and in Finland there is a significant gender 
wage gap of roughly 17% (European Commission 2018a). Koskinen 
Sandberg (2016) has shown that in a highly segregated labour market, 
sectoral collective agreements can contribute to the gender pay gap, 
even in the context of centralised incomes agreements. In a sense, 
disconnected sectoral collective agreement negotiations may provide 
an easier way to moderate public sector wage growth compared to 
centralised agreements, where also the public sector receives the same 
general wage increases. Therefore, the logic of European economic 
governance also provides an argument for decentralising collective 
agreement negotiations.
The Finnish labour market relations system is in its essence 
still corporatist, which means that through tripartite consultation, 
the interests between labour and capital are mediated through e.g. 
collective bargaining. The developments that started in 2007 reduced 
its scope because they enabled transferring core decision-making 
processes on labour market policy away from the corporatist actors 
to the open political arena. The “new” centralised agreements are 
characterised more flexibility to implement the agreement at the 
sectoral level than through the tupo. In this chapter, I view the 
institutional changes from the point of view of the “competence trap”. 
This has the benefit of highlighting the role of labour unions and 
labour union federations in relation to their institutional position 
and policy-making. At the same time, these institutional changes 
also show that Finland is following Nordic developments (Andersen, 
Ibsen, Alsos, Nergaard, & Sauramo 2015). Bergholm and Bieler (2013) 
explain that this “delayed” decentralisation may be due to a weaker 
structural power of the employers.
Lilja (1998) introduced the concept of “competence trap” in labour 
market relations research. A competence trap means that existing 
or otherwise dominant procedures that lead to positive results will 
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become entrenched because actors are profiting from experience 
within the organisation (Levitt & March 1988). In other words, a 
competence trap occurs when a union’s internal organisation and the 
skills of their officials are less suited to handling questions of work 
organisation, skill development and management (Alasoini 2004). 
This phenomenon has been shown to occur both in the use of new 
technologies and new processes of work (e.g. Zucker 1987). The idea 
of a competence trap is also relevant labour market relations research 
because labour unions are organisations with a strong institutional 
memory (Huzzard 2000; Huzzard, Gregory, & Scott 2004). 
The main problem concerning the competence trap of labour 
unions, according to Lilja (1998, 183), is that “there are no mechanisms 
at the industry collective bargaining level to intervene in the actual 
world of work and skill development in a proactive way”. In short, 
Lilja argues that because most union activities relate to institutions 
(collective bargaining, work safety, union managed unemployment 
funds), there is more focus on these specialties rather than 
involvement with actual working life. In particular, the centralised 
agreements “dictated” the content of collective agreements regarding 
the main issues, thus not allowing much flexibility at the sectoral or 
local levels. This means that although labour unions have a strong 
local presence through shop stewards and collective agreements, 
they may be more vulnerable to changes in either institutions or 
working life than assumed through their institutionally entrenched 
position. Dølvik (1997) argues that labour unions can have a “logic 
of representation” or a “logic of influence”, which is different way 
of explaining the relation between institutions and labour unions. 
In the Finnish case, the “logic of influence” may be the primary 
determent of action, because the rules and conventions regarding 
collective bargaining worked predominantly top-down until the 
“new” centralised agreements.
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To clarify this last point, it is useful to show the general pre-2008 
process of centralised collective bargaining (Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). 
In the Finnish system, even if a collective agreement has expired, 
its provisions remain valid until a new agreement is concluded (the 
sopimukseton tila). The only difference is that the so-called peace 
clause is not valid anymore—strikes are allowed to put pressure on the 
negotiations. Usually before this phase, labour union federations and 
employers’ federations have indicated their willingness to negotiate 
a centralised agreement, although sometimes this willingness has to 
be found through policy promises by the state on, for example, tax 
reductions. The most important negotiation at the centralised level 
is the general wage increase because this is binding for the collective 
agreements based on the centralised agreement. The issues relating 
to the content of centralised agreements are to a large extent non-
negotiable at the sectoral level. Other issues agreed between labour 
union federations, employers’ federations and the state are labour 
market policy directions, which may also include social policy issues 
such as pension. Furthermore, the state promises what it will do when 
the sectoral phase of collective bargaining is successfully completed. 
The threshold for successful completion recently has been the 
implementation of the centralised agreement by 90–95% of collective 
agreements, which is a much higher coverage than in the former 
“tupo” era (Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). The basis for this process is the so-
called “January Engagement” of 1940, when employers acknowledged 
labour unions as part of democratic society. This agreement also led 
to legislation on collective bargaining, industrial action and conflict 
mediation. Through a voluntaristic agreement, the labour market 
partners became a central part of labour market policy-making. This 
is the essence of Finnish labour market corporatism.
The main negotiation problem at the sectoral level is how to 
translate the general wage increase into the various wage levels and 
shift systems existing in the sectors. Applying a general wage increase 
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is easier in collective agreements that feature hourly wage (such as for 
cleaning personnel) than for manufacturing collective agreements 
that often have highly complex shift systems. For this reason, some 
sectors prefer wage increases in eurocents, while others prefer 
percentages. At the sectoral level working time issues and social 
provisions are also negotiated unless included in the centralised 
agreement. For example, general working time reductions were 
agreed in the centralised agreements of 1984 and 1986, and in 1992 
issues regarding income-dependent pensions were negotiated (SAK 
n.d.).
The core idea of this chapter is that Finnish labour unions have 
had to deal with sustained attacks on their main role as collective 
agreement negotiators since 2008 while being pressured to accept 
negotiation outcomes that were not necessarily positive for their 
membership. These negotiation outcomes derived from an analysis 
of Finnish competitiveness based on the metric of Unit Labour Costs, 
and in relation to that discourse, they exemplify the “competence 
trap”. This metric disregards sectoral and local difference, as well as 
the impact of changes in demand. Because the focus on ULC was 
the only legitimate discourse from the start of the financial crisis, 
labour unions had to focus on labour costs rather than on the quality 
of working life, in particular since 2013, as explained below. After 
2016, the labour unions additionally had to withstand the pressure 
emanating from the state to deliver certain outcomes, lest the state 
not intervene through legislation. The successful drive towards 
decentralisation (to the sectoral level) may lead to a change in focus 
on part of the labour unions because the institutional environment 
compels them to do so. The next section discusses the developments 
since 2008 in more detail.
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Labour market relations developments since 2008
Finland has had a positive period of growth since its economic and 
financial crisis of the 1990s, and the system of labour market relations 
did not have a serious test during the euro membership. In fact, the 
last centralised incomes agreement (of 2005–2007) was concluded in 
calm circumstances and had a record duration of three years. In fact, 
only the pulp and paper industry witnessed a protracted industrial 
conflict in 2005, but this sector had explicitly stayed out of that 
centralised incomes agreement (Jonker-Hoffrén 2011).
After the centralised agreement of 2005–2007 Finland had a 
period of sectoral agreements between 2007 and 2011. In practice, this 
consisted of two sectoral bargaining rounds and an attempt (in 2009) 
to introduce a “wage-anchor” in manufacturing that no subsequent 
collective agreement should exceed. Table 1 shows a summary of 
developments (see also Jonker-Hoffrén 2019).
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Table 1. Duration and main elements of centralised and sectoral agreements since 2005




(paper industry separate 
sectoral agreement, 
2005–2008)
longest centralised agreement in tupo history; in 
negotiations for next agreements there was a peculiar 




Sectoral yearly pay review, in practice two sectoral rounds 














focus on improving employment, competitiveness, potential 
reforms of labour market relations system, extreme wage 







focus on competitiveness and economic growth, creating 
jobs, consolidating government finances, wage freeze, 
working towards local bargaining. Originally 2015–2016, 
option for extension through 2017, which was implemented
2017–
2018
Sectoral Full implementation of EK’s rule change led to 
decentralisation to the sectoral level. Sectoral round mostly 
based on first manufacturing agreement (informal wage 
anchor)
The tensions between employers’ organisations and labour unions, 
especially in the public sector, stem from the collective agreements 
signed for the period 2007–2009. Many sectoral agreements featured 
relatively high wage increases. Figure 1 in Delahaie, Vandekerckhove, 
and Vincent (2017, 71) confirms that in 2007, there was indeed a 
sudden upwards trend in both collectively agreed (nominal) wages, 
although also before 2007, the nominal wage increases had outstripped 
increases in labour productivity. With the onset of the financial crisis 
shortly after the agreements for 2007–2009 had been finalised, a 
correction was needed in the “competitiveness” of Finland. This was 
also a theme for Finland in the European Semester’s country-specific 
recommendations where general wage moderation, in line with real 
productivity development, was recommended (Van Gyes & Schulten 
2015, 16).
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For a pilot study on labour market partners’ views on the European 
economic governance system, expert interviews were held in early 
2013. The experts were exclusively senior labour market negotiators of 
labour unions, employers’ federations and labour union federations. 
The interviews were transliterated and coded. The analysis used 
content analysis, because this was an exploratory study of the issue. 
The respondents (N=7) were generally unanimous regarding their 
view of the wage increases in collective agreements in the period 
2007–2011. As one researcher from the Service Union United PAM 
states:
“It kind of got out of hand, competing about collective 
agreement wage increases”.
His colleague stated:
“The public sector reached agreement last [in 2007], and 
they got the biggest wage increases”.
A former negotiator of SAK, the Confederation of Finnish Trade 
Unions commented:
“I still remember, in 2007, when the sectoral agreements 
were negotiated, they were spread over several years 
and they were far too expensive on every level from the 
perspective of the crash of the economy in 2008, and in part 
the competitiveness of the Finnish economy still suffers 
from this period”.
The former National Conciliator stated:
“Fantastic collective agreements were concluded then [in 
2007], wage increases to the tune of 11–15% over two years. 
So we had the agreed wage increases and then came the 
2008–2009 recession. Wages went up and production went 
down. […] It affects the competitiveness even today”.
The Finnish National Conciliator is the labour market mediator 
that becomes involved in collective agreement negotiations when 
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either party announced industrial action (strike/lock-out). Formally 
independent, he or she is a civil servant to the Ministry of Labour. 
When the National Conciliator is involved, his or her task is to 
produce a draft agreement that both parties to the conflict can agree 
on (Jonker-Hoffrén 2019). 
The depth of the economic recession that started in Finland in 
2008 immediately changed the context of the valid agreements, as 
the comment by the National Conciliator shows. The experts of 
the Services Sector Union explicitly state that the employers’ view 
changed rapidly in the light of the “scary economic situation”. Also the 
National Conciliator stated in the interview that it was a “pragmatic, 
practical decision” to again engage in a centralised agreement.
The “new” centralised agreements differ from their forebears in 
that these new agreements have much less focus on general wage 
increases than before and more focus on what is done at the firm 
level. In this sense, they continue the developments set in motion in 
2008. Moreover, one former negotiator of the Technology Industries 
Federation (employers) tells that the old centralised incomes 
agreements would dictate “some 90 percent of the content, form and 
conditions of the wage agreement [for the sectoral level] while the new 
Framework Agreement only dictates 50%”. His point is that the new 
agreements are significantly different in that these give the sectoral 
level more flexibility to implement what is agreed. 
The Framework Agreement, according to the National Conciliator, 
did not improve Finnish competitiveness, nor did it weaken it. The 
negotiator of the Technology Industries Federation states that many 
of the “quality of working life” issues that were agreed on in this 
agreement were specific wishes of the labour union federations and 
not appreciated by the employers’ federations. He alludes to a break 
between EK and the sectoral employers’ federations because EK had 
not sufficiently consulted the sectoral federations. EK’s member 
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organisations repaired this breakthrough dismissing its chairperson 
and selecting a successor in 2012 (see also Bergholm & Bieler 2013).
In 2013 the Employment and Growth Agreement was concluded. 
According to the negotiator of the Technology Industries, the 
sectoral unions of both labour market partners were highly involved, 
although this time the wishes of the employers’ federations set 
the tone. This resulted in a centralised agreement with extremely 
moderate wage increases, which was a reaction to the (continued) 
economic crisis. Furthermore, in 2015, the Confederation of Finnish 
Industries announced a change in its statutes. EK would no longer 
be able to negotiate binding agreements on its members’ behalf. 
Later, it resigned from most of the federation agreements that it had 
signed over the years. The Competitiveness Agreement (2015–2017) 
continued extreme wage moderation but was born in complicated 
circumstances: the Finnish state threatened with legislation that 
would alter the system of labour market relations unless sufficient 
coverage would be achieved for the Competitiveness Agreement. 
This agreement envisioned, among other things, a reduction in wage 
costs of 5% (Dølvik et al. 2018). From late 2017, Finland has thus been 
in a structurally new situation, where negotiations take place at the 
sectoral level. 
Unit Labour Costs and the competitiveness discourse
Starting from the so-called Employment and Competitiveness 
Agreement of 2013, the employers’ federations and EK were united in 
demanding extreme wage moderation and issues relating to “structural 
reforms”. According to the Technology Industries negotiator, the 
reason for this focus was the downwards turn the Finnish economy 
took in 2012. Although EK had already earlier made a comparison 
between Finnish and German Unit Labour Costs, in the period after 
2011, the employers’ federations and EK frequently mentioned the 
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difference as an indication of Finland’s worsened competitiveness. 
Also the Bank of Finland reported and reports frequently about unit 
labour costs (e.g. Euro ja Talous 2016). It should also be noted that 
historically Finnish corporatism always had a strong focus on wage 
moderation (Kosonen 1998). 
However, the new European Economic Governance rules, the 
so-called “Two-Pack” and “Six-Pack”, have probably strengthened 
the discourse of the employers’ federations (European Commission 
2017). Part of the “Six-Pack”, the so-called Alert Mechanism Report, 
has been a part of the European Commission’s Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure (MIP). This report is a preparation for in-depth 
country reviews (Eurofound 2014). In the first two reports of 2012, the 
review of Finland especially singled out the rise in Unit Labour Costs 
in 2007–2009. The Country-specific Recommendations (which also 
belongs to the “Six-Pack), policy recommendations that follow from 
the European Semester process”, are to be adopted by the national 
finance ministers. In 2012, the Finnish recommendations regarding 
the period 2008–2010 stated:
“These excessive wage increases are reflected in the unit 
labour cost increase reported in the Alert Mechanism 
Report at 12.3% over the period 2008–2010. […] Finland 
will have to ensure that wage developments do not endanger 
future competitiveness and will have to facilitate necessary 
structural changes over the longer term” (European 
Commission 2012).
Subsequent in-depth reviews continue to stress the unit labour cost 
metric. The country report for 2018 states that Finland has made 
progress:
“implementation of the CSRs since 2014. Progress has 
been made in aligning wage growth with productivity 
developments which has resulted in a slower increase of unit 
labour costs and improved cost competitiveness relative to 
competitor economies” (European Commission 2018b).
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The reports single out the centralised agreements that have helped 
limit the growth of unit labour costs:
“Since 2015, the country’s real effective exchange rate has 
fallen each year, reflecting the moderate wage increases 
reached in the 2013 wage settlement. In 2016 and 2017, the 
Competitiveness Pact enabled unit labour cost to decrease. 
[…] The positive trend is expected to continue in 2018 
and 2019 (9). Overall, this has resulted in improved cost 
competitiveness” (European Commission 2018b).
This detour through the European Economic Governance shows one 
regulative reason why Unit Labour Costs (ULC) are an important 
measure of competitiveness. On this basis, they have a significant 
role in the national context, at least for the Euro area countries. 
Nonetheless, this measure has been criticised, for example by 
Knibbe (2015) and Kajanoja (2015). Knibbe (2015) argues the main 
reason ULC is an unsuitable measure of competitiveness is that ULC 
in fact does not measure much else than “a crude approximation 
for the share of GDP going to workers”. This is due to the fact that 
Eurostat (and by extension the national statistics bureaus) defines 
unit labour costs as the “nominal labour costs per employee divided 
by real average value added (GDP) per worker”. Furthermore, 
variables used in the nominator and denominator use employees 
and all labour respectively. This definition shows that because of the 
inclusion of GDP, this indicator is influenced greatly by changes in 
the economic fortunes of a country. Similarly, Kajanoja (2015) argues 
that nominal unit labour costs are unsuitable because of the peculiar 
price developments in Finnish manufacturing industries compared 
to competitor countries. He argues that for the “open sector” (export 
sector), Real Unit Labour Costs are a suitable measure, and for the 
“closed” (domestic) sector, Nominal Unit Labour Costs would fit. 
The main problem, however, even with the distinction between open 
and closed sector, is that these measures do not take developments 
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in the various sector sufficiently into account. As Knibbe argues, 
“an increase of the production of natural gas in the Netherlands will 
lower the RULC, an increase in construction will increase RULC” 
(2015, 7). Analysis of ULC depends on careful examination of sectoral 
developments. European Commission (2012) acknowledges this with 
a (short) analysis of ULC in the manufacturing, construction, market 
services and financial and banking services (15). It is interesting 
to see that also in European Commission (2013), the ULC of the 
manufacturing sector quickly decrease again, in contrast to the 
market services sector. In this sector, which covers services excluding 
public administration, ULC have steadily risen since the late 1990s.
In this context, it is interesting to see that in the Finnish Finance 
Ministry’s economic reports, there is little attention to other sectors 
than the export sectors. Already in 2008, the Ministry’s report 
connected wage negotiations with the rise of ULC in industry:
“Stopping the weakening of competitiveness and turning 
competitiveness to an improving path sets especially tight 
limits on wage formation” (VM 2008, 43). 
In the report from Spring 2010, the Ministry explicitly mentioned 
that the increase in ULC was due to the sudden drop in production in 
industry (due to weakened European/global demand) and the wage 
agreements of 2008–2009:
“The increase of ULC that started in the beginning of 
2008 reached an exceptional 29% in last year [2009], when 
industrial production declined more than the rest of the 
economy and wages continued their agreed growth. Unit 
Labour Costs in industry increased more in one year then 
they declined in the ten years before” (VM 2010, 50). 
Although the Ministry identifies the two main factors in the increase of 
Unit Labour Costs, the public discussion quickly turned to the effects 
of the collective agreements. For example, EK in 2009 stated that to 
keep competitiveness at the same level as the previous year, wage costs 
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should decline (YLE 2009a). The chairperson of the Confederation of 
Salaried Employees (STTK) stated that its unions would be ready to 
have a three-year centralised zero-increase agreement because “we 
have to save the fatherland” (YLE 2009b). The leaders of the industrial 
unions nonetheless dismissed this idea (YLE 2009c). The employers’ 
federation EK also dismissed this idea as being not enough while 
restating a refusal to return to centralised agreements (YLE 2009d). 
Slightly later, the new chairman of SAK dismissed the employers’ 
goal of zero percent increases and wage reductions and he expressed 
worry about purchasing power and unemployment (YLE 2009e). 
These positions are consistent with the broader economic 
discussion in Finland. As Harjuniemi, Herkman, and Ojala (2015) 
find, there is not much support for alternative solutions in the context 
of the euro crisis, such as stimulating domestic demand. In 2015, 
a senior Bank of Finland economist even stated that stimulus had 
reduced exports in Finland, especially through wage increases (YLE 
2015).
These examples show that in Finland, the economic crisis has 
been seen explicitly through the lens of labour market relations and 
collective agreements. The willingness of STTK to stick to the zero-
increase policy and later the acknowledgment of SAK that the “new” 
centralised agreements had helped increase Finnish competitiveness 
through keeping a lid on ULC increases both show that significant 
parts of the labour union federations share this focus (SAK 2016). 
In this context, it is useful to mention that in particular the (female-
dominated) public sector unions have quite consistently demanded 
wage increases in the view of the wage gap (YLE 2007; 2017). The 2007 
nurses’ strike is a clear example (Koskinen Sandberg 2016, 14). From 
the point of European Economic Governance, this has been difficult, 
especially in economic bad weather because, both domestically and 
at the EU-level, there has been pressure on Finland to stick to the 
Maastricht criteria, which do not necessarily allow wage increases.
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Conclusion: Competence trap and 
post-2017 developments
The previous sections have shown the changes in the Finnish system 
of labour market relations. The “organized decentralisation” has 
happened primarily from the initiative of the employers’ federations. 
Organized decentralisation in the Finnish context means that 
issues previously negotiated at a higher level can be decentralised 
through stipulations of collective agreements (see Jonker-Hoffrén 
2019). Regarding the substantial changes in collective agreements, 
especially the “new” centralised agreements, it is important to 
acknowledge the pressure the state put on the labour market partners 
in 2016, and in particular the labour unions, to conclude a deal that 
would satisfy the requirements of the state. The state wanted to force 
the labour market partners to conclude a deal that would improve 
the competitiveness of Finland. For the unions, this episode perhaps 
epitomises the “competence trap” because their focus had to be on 
the negotiations and dealing with the pressure from both state and 
employers rather than “[intervention] in the actual world of work and 
skill development in a proactive way”. The core objective was doing its 
part in restoring Finnish competitiveness. 
Finland is bound to the economic governance architecture of the 
Eurozone, which means that both state and labour market partners 
do not necessarily have much flexibility, especially in downturns. 
The new Finnish labour market system, which enables only sectoral 
bargaining, has effectively decoupled the domestic, public and 
export sectors. Giving up the traditional tri-partite bargaining may 
have been a blow to especially the labour movement because it has 
been focused on the solidaristic wage policies for so long. On the 
other hand, it can also be argued that the new model better reflects 
the regulatory and competitive pressures these sectors face—the 
Maastricht criteria influence the labour market relations in a way that 
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the export sector does not experience and vice versa regarding global 
market developments.
An interesting question regarding economic discourses is still 
open: how and why did ULC come to the forefront when it did? 
In the 2000s, it seemed that the discourse was rather on R&D and 
quality. This question requires more research and interviews with, 
for example, labour union economists and actors from the employers’ 
federations.
The current situation in 2020 is that Finland has successfully 
completed a sectoral bargaining round with moderate wage increases 
and openings to more local bargaining on wages following the first 
agreement of the technology industry (manufacturing). A casual 
glance shows positive signs towards the general mood regarding 
local bargaining. For example, the Service Union United PAM earlier 
stated that local bargaining is a way of quickly improving working 
conditions (PAM 2018). The union AKAVA Special Branches reports 
of a membership questionnaire, which asked about important issues 
for local bargaining. Members regarded issues like work-life balance, 
possibilities to have influence, motivation and general working 
conditions as most important for local bargaining (Akavan Erityisalat 
2018). Further empirical research should show whether labour unions 
actually have increased their local influence. What conditions enable 
this influence to become established? It is reasonable to expect that 
this requires strong local union representation. It is possible that the 
dramatic changes in the labour market relations system have thereby 
reduced the risk of the “competence trap” by forcing the unions to 
turn their gaze to the local level. Unions have worked skilfully at the 
local level through co-determination procedures, as Sippola (2012) 
shows. In recent years these procedures have nonetheless often 
looked like “redundancy management procedures”. The current 
process of renewal of this law could help unions to achieve stronger 
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local influence. Furthermore, it will be interesting to follow how and 
where the metric of ULC will be used in the future.
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Alternative for work, low-income 
supplement or investment?
Exploring the idea of basic income 
in the Finnish public debate
Johanna Perkiö
Introduction
The idea of an unconditional basic income granted to all members 
of society on a regular basis1 has gained growing global attention in 
recent years. However, the idea has a long history in both academic 
(see Widerquist, Noguera, Vanderborght, & De Wispelaere 2014) and 
political discussions (see Van der Veen & Groot 2000; Caputo 2012) 
in various countries. The idea has risen on the agenda in countries 
such as Finland, the Netherlands and Canada, whose local or 
national governments have recently carried out basic income related 
experiments.
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Finland is one of the countries in which the public and political 
attention to basic income has been intense and long-lasting. The idea 
has been featured in manifestos of political parties (Koistinen & 
Perkiö 2014), in parliamentary debates (Perkiö 2020) and eventually 
in the platform of the 2015–2019 centre-right coalition government of 
PM Juha Sipilä as a commitment to experiment the scheme. The aim 
of the two-year trial that ran from January 2017 to December 2018 was 
“to explore whether basic income could be used to reform the social 
security system so as to reduce incentive traps relating to working” 
(STM 2020). The trial consisted of giving a basic income of €560 a 
month (that is equivalent to the level of minimum unemployment 
benefit after taxes) to 2000 randomly selected individuals across the 
country unconditionally and without means-testing. All recipients 
were between the ages of 25 and 58 and had formerly received 
unemployment benefits.
This chapter sheds light on the history of Finnish public debate 
on basic income. Drawing on an empirical analysis on the coverage 
of the issue in the leading daily newspaper, it argues firstly that 
basic income has not occurred as a coherent idea, but the way it has 
been depicted has varied over time. Secondly, the article shows how 
understanding of the basic income idea has often been rather far 
from how most academics (in particular social philosophers) have 
considered it. More than a radical measure of individual freedom, 
basic income has appeared as a practical tool for pursuing the goals 
of mainstream employment and social policies. 
The chapter builds on a content analysis of the basic income 
discussion from 1980 to 2015 in Helsingin Sanomat, the leading daily 
newspaper in Finland. The data includes altogether more than 1100 
newspaper stories of different categories (news, opinions, articles, 
editorials and columns) in which the concept of basic income or 
citizen’s wage (that term has been used for roughly the same meaning) 
appears. There is a great variation in the number of texts per year, 
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ranging from three in 1982 to 98 in 2015. The main idea behind both 
concepts has been to introduce a more uniform and universal system 
of minimum social protection which would involve fewer conditions 
to the recipients than the existing welfare schemes. However, the 
concept of citizen’s wage has sometimes been used to refer to a 
conditional system, in which the benefit would be subject to some 
kind of activity for “common good”, whereas basic income has most 
often referred to a universal and unconditional welfare provision. 
In the newspaper stories, one can find various views and 
disagreements in the discussion of the possible consequences of 
introducing a basic income (or citizen’s wage) system. The opinions 
differ not only between proponents and opponents of the scheme, 
but also between proponents with different ideological perspectives 
(see Perkiö 2013) since basic income has gained both support and 
opposition across the political spectrum. This article, however, does 
not pay attention to the conflicting viewpoints but attempts to identify 
strong narratives and dominant discourses that were shared by most 
of those participating in the discussion at a given time.
The Finnish basic income debate from 1980 to 2015
The debate on the basic income idea began in Finland in the early 
1980s, first with the concept of citizen’s wage. The idea emerged as 
a part of the wider discourse concerning the future of employment, 
led mostly by academics and other social influencers. Automated 
production was anticipated to replace a significant part of the 
industrial employment, and citizen’s wage was mainly regarded as a 
way to provide alternatives for full employment. The supply of labour 
was to be set at the corresponding level with the declining demand by 
introducing new policies such as job-sharing, civil work and citizens’ 
wage. The 1980s discourse often called for a new understanding of 
the concept of work and ways to provide means for dignified life and 
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participation in society for those excluded from the labour market 
by technological progress. The following quotations from the data 
illustrate the typical reasoning for citizen’s wage in the 1980s:2
1. “there will be less and less useful paid work available every 
year” (1980) 
2. “automation will take away more jobs than even the best 
economic boom will bring” (1981)
3. “widening the concept of work to the areas that are now 
considered as hobbies needs to be placed next to a more equal 
distribution of work” (1981)
4. “If all human activity that people do for developing themselves 
and their environment were considered as societally valuable 
work, there would no more be unemployment” (1986)
Therefore, during the 1980s, the idea of citizen’s wage occurred 
almost exclusively as an alternative for paid work. It was regarded as 
a “secondary” wage for those who could no more sustain themselves 
by their own labour. Sometimes citizen’s wage was considered as 
a conditional payment, which would involve some activities for 
common good by the recipients. The grant was meant to be especially 
for those whose contribution was no longer needed in the labour 
market. The 1980s discourse often painted a picture of society in 
which people would work less on the “hard” market sector and 
devote more time for personally and socially meaningful activities in 
households, neighbourhoods and civil society.
Towards the late 1980s and in the early 1990s, the citizen’s wage 
discourse became more concerned with the practical problems of 
the social security system. It was understood as way to simplify the 
complex social protection system and provide better coverage for all 
citizens.
2 The quotations were translated from Finnish to English by the author.
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In the aftermath of the economic depression of the early 1990s, the 
understanding of the idea radically changed. The shift co-occurred 
with a conceptual change, whereby the concept of citizen’s wage was 
gradually replaced by basic income. From the mid-1990s onwards, 
the idea of basic income was mainly discussed as a way to reduce 
the welfare bureaucracy and to activate the unemployed to take 
part in the labour market. The context for the new rationale was the 
mass unemployment that persisted throughout the decade and the 
increasing attraction of neoliberal ideas among policymakers, which 
led them to seek primarily supply side solutions to the unemployment 
crisis (e.g. Kantola & Kananen 2013). One proposed solution was to 
stimulate the service sector employment by enabling lower salaries and 
labour costs than those of the (more productive) industrial workers. In 
the late 1990s, altogether four political parties placed basic income or 
a related concept on their agendas, two of them incorporating it into 
neoliberal reform agendas concerning labour market deregulation 
and reduction of taxes and welfare expenses. The role of basic income 
was to supplement small and irregular income and soften the impacts 
of the proposed labour market reforms to the workers. When workers 
had a (rather low) basic income as an unconditional income floor, 
taking up a job—however small the income it provides—would pay 
more than staying at home. The following quotations illustrate the 
changed rationale of the basic income idea in the 1990s:
5. “basic income model leads to a situation where taking up even 
a small scale job is always profitable, whereas now it is often the 
most economical to stay fully unemployed” (1994) 
6. “basic income would encourage work” (1995)
7. “the central aim is to make it possible that even a low-paid job 
is worthwhile to accept” (1997)
8. “we can say that just basic income is favourable to work” (1998) 
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Unlike in the 1980s, the main concern in the basic income debate was 
now how to provide better incentives for paid work. The deliberation 
on the nature and future of work became a rather marginal discourse. 
Basic income was primarily understood as a supplement for small 
labour income. Instead of offering alternatives for paid work, it could 
activate people to work more. It was often emphasised that the level 
of basic income should not be set so high as to give incentives to 
withdraw from the labour market and live at the expense of society. 
However, sometimes the idea was linked to “job-sharing”, another 
powerful idea in the 1990s that suggested those working full-time 
could reduce their labour, whereas the unemployed could take up the 
new jobs that would become available. The role of basic income was 
to create alternatives between full-time unemployment and full-time 
employment by simultaneously improving incentives to work and 
making shorter working times a more feasible option. 
In the late 1990s, a new discourse emerged that emphasised that 
life had become more insecure and unpredictable and that the “old” 
welfare system was ill-suited to respond the new risks of rapidly 
changing life and employment situations. This was connected to the 
observed increase in “atypical” employment. It was argued that life 
does not follow the traditional patterns anymore, and social security 
should enable more flexible combinations of work, family, studies 
and leisure time according to one’s own needs and preferences. This 
discourse grew stronger in the basic income debate during the 2000s.
In the early 2000s, the amount of public discussion on basic 
income was relatively low. The idea re-emerged in 2006 with rise 
of the youth movement against precarious working conditions 
(precarity movement). The activists introduced new perspectives 
on basic income that largely confronted the mainstream politics 
and morality. They approached the issue from the perspective of 
power and income distribution. Basic income was called for not as 
a better functioning social policy, but as the precariat’s bargaining 
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weapon against the exploitative employers. The activists argued that a 
growing amount of work takes place in networks outside of standard 
working hours or places, and they regarded basic income as a way 
to remunerate activities outside paid employment that accumulate 
the capitalist value. They criticised the “old” left’s (especially trade 
unions) propensity to nurture “outdated” conceptions of work and to 
regard work as a value per se, as well as attempts to introduce a low 
basic income in order to activate people to take up more low-paid 
jobs. Instead, basic income was considered as a tool to provide more 
autonomy for precarious workers to decide when, how and for whom 
to work.
The precarity movement’s appearance was followed by a 
widespread public debate in which many politicians and academics 
took part. Especially the Green Party promoted basic income as a way 
to improve the economic security of those working on an irregular 
basis, to streamline the bureaucratic benefit system and to provide 
better incentives to work. Unlike in the 1990s, the focus was now in 
“atypical” employment and growing insecurity of life rather than 
unemployment as such. The traditional welfare system was seen ill-
suited to the changing labour market realities, and basic income was 
argued to be a more flexible scheme which would treat all recipients 
equally and cover the gaps in social protection. The key argument for 
basic income was that it would make all economic activities always 
rewarding. It was also regarded as an investment to new forms of 
economic and non-economic activities, especially entrepreneurship 
and creative work. The following quotations illustrate the different 
perspectives on basic income from 2000 to 2015:
9. “the unconditionality of basic income would guarantee that 
one does not need to accept any job, and especially not at any 
price” (2006) 
10. “if everyone received a monthly small basic income a decent 
standard of living could be reached by lower earnings” (2006) 
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11. “basic income granted to all will also lay the foundation to the 
way of living in the new circumstances, where earnings are 
acquired by many parallel, often sporadic jobs” (2006)
12. “the (Green) party estimates that basic income would free the 
desire for work and entrepreneurship which is hidden in the 
society better than the contemporary social benefits” (2007)
13. “the division between wage earners and entrepreneurs does 
not fully hold anymore” (2009)
14. “another benefit of any basic income model would be placing 
the small income groups now factitiously in different positions, 
such as entrepreneurs, freelancers and students, on the same 
line” (2012)
In the last years examined by this study there was a minor shift in 
the focus of the debate: the automation of work (due to digitalisation) 
became again a key issue. However, the recipe to combat the 
threatening employment crisis by basic income was now to create 
better incentives for irregular work, not to provide possibilities for 
meaningful life outside labour market as in the 1980s.
Conclusions
This article demonstrates how a policy idea evolves over time 
following the shifts in society and in the political discourse. The 
rationale of citizen’s wage in the 1980s was to provide dignified and 
meaningful alternatives for paid work for those pushed out of the 
labour market by technological development. In the context of the 
1990s mass unemployment, the rationale shifted and basic income 
became to be understood as an activation measure and low income 
supplement. In the 2000s, the precarity movement’s approach was to 
question the intrinsic value of paid work and the prevailing socio-
economic relations. The movement regarded basic income primarily 
Alternative for work, low-income supplement or investment?
189Shaping and re-shaping the boundaries of working life
as a tool to improve the bargaining position of precarious workers. In 
the following debate, the key concerns were the incentive structure 
of the existing welfare system and the daily subsistence of those 
in atypical employment. Basic income was also understood as an 
investment to boost new economic activities and to obtain a higher 
employment rate.
In the academic literature, basic income has often been portrayed 
as a radical departure from the principles of existing welfare policies. 
It has been presented as a means to provide greater individual 
freedom for all (Van Parijs 1995), to transform labour-capital power 
relations (Wright 2006) and to pave the way towards ecologically 
more sustainable economy and lifestyle (Andersson 2009; Fitzpatrick 
2009; 2013; Goodin 2013). This article shows how the radical idea is 
translated into language of everyday policymaking in order to be 
perceived as a realistic alternative. In the Finnish public debate, basic 
income became to be seen from the 1990s onwards as a technical 
solution to pursue those goals that were prevalent in the mainstream 
policy agenda rather than a way towards a different social order, as it 
was in the 1980s. This re-framing of the idea in a way that resonated 
with the “political winds” of the time is likely to explain why the basic 
income discourse did not fall into the political margins, as happened 
in Denmark (Christensen 2008). 
Apart from few confronting voices, such as that of the precarity 
movement, the Finnish basic income discourse, as it occurred in the 
leading newspaper, was strengthening the existing moral boundaries 
of society rather than challenging them. Nevertheless, the basic 
income discourse questioned the realism of stable and high quality 
full-employment that has historically been an elementary part of the 
Nordic welfare tradition. However, it still did it by celebrating the 
intrinsic value of work and presenting basic income as the best way to 
incentivise people to work more. Accommodating the “radical” idea 
as a part of the dominant policy discourse may explain why it has 
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gained much attention among policymakers in Finland compared to 
countries such as Germany (Liebermann 2012) where it has rather 
been promoted by social movements as a markedly alternative welfare 
strategy.
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